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Universal Exceptionalism in International Law 
 
Anu Bradford and Eric A. Posner1 
 
February 3, 2010 
 
Abstract. A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is an 
“exceptionalist” nation, one that takes a distinctive (frequently hostile, unilateralist, or 
hypocritical) stance toward international law. However, all major powers are similarly 
“exceptionalist,” in the sense that they take distinctive approaches to international law 
that reflect their values and interests. We illustrate these arguments with discussions of 
China, the European Union, and the United States. Charges of international-law 
exceptionalism betray an undefended assumption that one particular view of international 
law (for scholars, usually the European view) is universally valid. 
 
 Among international lawyers, it has long been conventional wisdom that the 
United States acts differently from other states. In the nineteenth century, it kept to itself, 
refusing to participate in the wars and alliances that preoccupied European powers. In the 
twentieth century, it arrogated for itself the role of global leader. After World War II, the 
United States was the primary force behind the construction of all the major international 
institutions—the United Nations, including its human rights regime, the GATT/WTO 
trade system, the development and financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, and the security arrangement embodied by NATO. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was transformed from one of two 
superpowers into the sole hyperpower. 
 
 And yet the United States has, throughout this entire period, showed ambivalence 
about international law. More than any other state, the United States put financial and 
diplomatic resources into advancing human rights; yet it refused to ratify most of the 
major human rights treaties, and has committed major human rights violations, including 
torture in its operations against Al Qaida. It promoted the trade system yet has from time 
to time engaged in protectionist measures. It hosts the United Nations and is its largest 
dues-payer, yet it has violated the UN Charter by launching wars without Security 
Council approval and frequently has been in arrears on its dues. It helped negotiate a 
number of important treaties—including the Law of the Sea Convention, the Rome 
Statute, which created the International Criminal Court, and the Vienna Convention on 
                                                            
1 Assistant Professor of Law and Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
Thanks to Daniel Abebe, Gabby Blum, Curtis Bradley, William Burke-White, Ruoying Chen, Tom 
Ginsburg, Jack Goldsmith, Katerina Linos, Darryl Robinson, Joel Trachtman, and participants in a seminar 
at Queen’s University, for helpful comments, and to Charles Woodworth and Hanna Chung for research 
assistance. 
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Treaties—and then refused to ratify them. It has resisted numerous efforts to strengthen 
the laws of war and to ban weapons such as landmines.2 
 In recent years, scholars have searched for explanations for this apparently 
distinctive stance toward international law. The usual political-science theories of state 
behavior assume that states act in roughly the same way. They might have different 
capacities and populations, but they all seek to maximize their security (as the realists 
argue) or to enhance national welfare (as rational institutionalists argue). So the recent 
literature has sought explanations for America’s distinctive international behavior in 
unique attributes of the United States. 
 
 The most common explanation today appeals to a long line of literature on 
“American exceptionalism.” This literature, which goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America, holds that the United States is different from all other countries.3 
In Tocqueville’s time, the United States was the only large country with authentic 
democratic institutions. Today, most countries are democracies but the United States 
remains distinctive among them. Ideologically, the United States is more committed to 
democracy (as opposed to rule by the elites), equality of opportunity (as opposed to 
equality of outcomes), individualism (as opposed to collectivism), and the free market. 
Culturally, Americans are more religious, more skeptical of authority, more militaristic, 
and more patriotic.4 Institutionally, the country is more decentralized, more legalistic, and 
more open to democratic participation.5 
 
 How might American exceptionalism explain America’s international behavior? 
One argument is that Americans believe that the United States, as the preeminent nation, 
perhaps one with a unique mission to promote freedom and democracy, cannot be 
required to submit to international institutions.6 Another is that Americans are less liberal 
than people in other countries, and so they oppose international legal change that 
                                                            
2 For the bill of particulars, see, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human 
Rights, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Harold Koh, 
On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480-83 (2003); Anne Peters, Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 579, 604-05 (2006); Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and 
Its False Prophets, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 9-13 (Nov./Dec. 2000). 
3  See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop eds., 2000). 
4 See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996). 
5 See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1993-95 (2004). 
6 See Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony and the Management of 
Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 677, 688 (2004); LIPSET, supra note 4, at 289; Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1396-97 (2006). 
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liberalizes international relations to a degree beyond that of which Americans approve.7 
Other explanations appeal to distinctive attributes of American political institutions—for 
example, federalism and the high bar for ratifying treaties.8 
 In this paper, we attack the premise of these arguments. The American stance 
toward international law is not distinctive or exceptional—or, put differently, the United 
States is no more exceptional than any other powerful country. When creating 
international norms, powerful nations characteristically advance interpretations of 
international law that reflect their values and advance their interests. Similarly, powerful 
nations’ willingness to ratify or comply with international norms hinges on the 
consistency of those norms with their values and interests. This type of “exceptionalism” 
is therefore not the exclusive preserve of one state. Today, the United States, China, and 
the European Union (“EU”) advance conflicting interpretations of international law. 
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union did the same.9 The focus on 
American exceptionalism blinds scholars to the similar behavior occurring elsewhere.10 
 
 We further argue that international law is best understood as an overlapping 
consensus of the otherwise “exceptional” views of the great powers. At the core are legal 
norms to which virtually every nation considers itself bound. Outside the core, there is a 
conflict. In this area of conflict, nations make inconsistent claims as to the meaning of 
international law. It is a significant mistake for scholars to accept the claims of any one 
nation as to the meaning of international law in this disputed area. It is also a mistake to 
dismiss a nations’ interpretation of a treaty (for example) as automatically wrong. As 
long as nations disagree about the meaning of treaties and other sources of international 
law, the content of international law remains unsettled. 
  
 This argument is not entirely new, though it seems to have been forgotten. Hans 
Morgenthau’s influential realist treatise, Politics Among Nations, notes in passing that all 
nations interpret or “misinterpret” international law so as to advance their ends, but he 
                                                            
7 See Ignatieff, supra note 2; Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1337-38, 1389-92); Anne-Marie Burley, Toward an 
Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 403-04 (1992); cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in 
a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995). 
8 See Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the 
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1307-12 (2008). 
9 Some distinctive doctrines of the Soviet view included, at various times, (1) the right to repudiate treaty 
obligations after a socialist revolution; (2) the right to intervene to assist a socialist revolution; (3) the right 
to intervene in capitalist countries that fail to protect workers’ rights. See generally KAZIMIERZ 
GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINES AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1970); 
TARJA LÅNGSTRÖM, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 50–117 (2003). 
10 A typical view is that Europeans, unlike the Americans, do not have the power to pursue their values in 
international law because they are too weak. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffman, American Exceptionalism: The 
New Version, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 225-26. We disagree 
with this premise. 
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makes an exception for “codifications,” which we reject.11 States offer self-interested 
interpretations of codes and treaties just as they do for customary international law, which 
was the focus of Morgenthau’s discussion. Lassa Oppenheim’s treatise on international 
law notes, but rejects, attacks on the universality of international law by commentators 
who argued that distinctive Soviet and German versions of international law existed 
between the two world wars. “These and similar intrusions of national policies into the 
sphere of International Law are essentially transient,” Oppenheim argues.12 We argue, by 
contrast, that disagreements about international law among the great powers are persistent 
and of great significance, although, as noted, a core of overlapping consensus does exist. 
 
 This paper describes the different “exceptionalisms” of the United States, China, 
and the EU. For each state, we trace their “exceptional” international behavior to their 
“exceptional” domestic interests, values, and institutions. While it is sometimes assumed 
that the European position on international law is in fact the correct position on 
international law,13 we argue that, in fact, the European position is just one among many 
approaches to international law that reflect a mixture of national self-interest and national 
(as opposed to universal) values. The United States looks less distinctive when compared 
to the world as a whole, than when it is compared only to the European democracies. 
Each exceptionalist state advances a particular version of international law that must be 
judged on its merits against some standard of morality; the accusation of exceptionalism 
is a straw-man attack.14 
 
 Our argument is descriptive, not normative. We do not argue that any country’s 
view of international law is the correct one. 
 
I. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
A. Universalism and Exceptionalism 
 
 By universalism, we refer to the view that the rules of international law apply to 
all states. By exceptionalism, we refer to the view that the values of one particular 
country should be reflected in the norms of international law. By exemptionalism, we 
                                                            
11 See HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER AND PEACE 298-99 (Knopf 6th ed. 1985). 
12 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 56 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 
13 See, e.g., our discussion of Michael Ignatieff’s views, infra Part I.B. 
14 In the modern legal literature, the lone example of this view that we have found is Sabrina Safrin, The 
Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1307 (2008), who argues that the 
American stance to international law is not exceptional. Our argument builds on her work. Some skepticism 
about the usefulness of the notion of American exceptionalism in international law can also be found in 
Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 323 (2009). 
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refer to the claim that the rules of international law, or of certain international treaties, 
should apply to all states except for one particular state.15 
 
 At one time, international law consisted of a set of contracts involving (usually) 
pairs of states, along with some general norms of customary international law that were 
derived from state practice and the official statements of governments and other state 
institutions. Occasional multilateral treaties would address the resolution of military 
conflicts involving multiple states such as the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars. In the 
twentieth century, all this changed. Although states continued to enter bilateral treaties, 
they increasingly established fora—notably, the United Nations—for negotiating treaties 
involving issues of global concern, including the laws of war, human rights, protection of 
the environment, trade, and regulation of the seas. All states would be invited to send 
delegates to these conventions, and the expectation was always that the treaty obligations 
would be the same for all states, large and small, rich and poor. 
 
 These practices have helped established a presumption of universalism. Once a 
global problem is identified, it is understood that an international solution binding all 
states should be sought. To be sure, states may continue to negotiate bilateral and 
regional agreements to address narrow cross-border and regional problems, but these 
agreements, though numerous, must be consistent with states’ obligations under 
multilateral treaties. 
 
 We use the term exceptionalism to refer to the attitude of a state that believes that 
it is a model or leader in international relations because of its unique attributes. The state 
may hold that its institutions are the best in the world, or that it has a historical mission—
and for these reasons, the state’s commitments should be the world’s as well. 
Exceptionalism does not imply exemptionalism. An exceptional state may choose to 
comply with the rules of international law with which it disagrees. If it does violate the 
rules of international law, or some of those rules, it argues that those rules are 
inconsistent with international law properly understood. In doing so, it typically claims 
that some alternative rules should apply to all states equally, including itself. Thus, 
exceptional states need not abandon universalism, and indeed they rarely do. The 
exceptional state need not take the next step of exemptionalism, and argue that the rules 
apply to all other states but not itself. As we will see, this distinction is crucial; 
exceptional states are often accused of exemptionalism, in most instances inaccurately. 
 
 To understand this difference, compare two arguments often made about the 
United States’ attitude toward international law. Some people argue that the United States 
                                                            
15 Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 4. The term is his. 
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should be exempted from certain types of international criminal jurisdiction because 
America sends soldiers around the world to promote democracy and keep the peace.16 
This argument is exemptionalist. The United States has not made this argument; instead, 
it has sought safeguards on criminal jurisdiction—such as the precondition of Security 
Council authorization before the International Criminal Court can launch 
investigations—that ensure that no state that takes proper steps to uphold the international 
order will find its citizens in an international court. Thus, the United States has not 
argued that it ought to be exempted from the rules.17 Instead, it has insisted—consistent 
with exceptionalism—that American norms and practices should provide the basis for 
international law. 
 
 Exceptional states—which are always great powers, although not all great powers 
are exceptional states—characteristically advance universalistic views of international 
law that embody those states’ exceptional norms. We can distinguish two stages at which 
this occurs. First, exceptional states attempt to influence the development of international 
norms during treaty negotiations, so that international law reflects their values and 
interests. Exceptional states are hardly alone in this respect, but because of their greater 
power, they are more often successful, generating resentment among other states. Second, 
exceptional states attempt to influence the development of international norms at the 
stage of compliance. They often assert interpretations of existing treaty obligations that 
reflect their values and interests, in some cases following up these interpretations with 
actions that other states regard as violations of international law. Again, normal states do 
this as well, but exceptional states are far more aggressive and successful. 
 
B. The Standard View: American Exceptionalism and European Universalism 
 
 Consider this seeming paradox: the United States has been the leader in advancing 
human rights around the world since 1945, and yet at the same time it has both violated 
human rights itself and coddled tyrants who violate rights. The United States led the way 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations, and the 
International Covenant for Civil and “Political Rights, and has put economic and military 
pressure on human-rights violating states—far more than any other state has. But it has 
also, to quote Michael Ignatieff, 
                                                            
16 See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 688, 696-99; see also 147 Cong. Rec. S10,042 (Oct. 2, 2001) (statement 
of Sen. Helms) (supporting a bill aimed at hindering the International Criminal Court, because the United 
States “owes it . . . to our men and women representing this country, both in the military and in civilian 
agencies,” as they “get ready for a long campaign against global terrorists,” to protect their actions from 
U.N. “second-guessing”). 
17 The United States does benefit from its veto in the Security Council, and in this sense one might argue 
that it seeks a system in which other states are bound to norms that it can avoid—de facto. We discuss this 
argument in Part V.C. 
8 
 
 
supported rights-abusing regimes from Pinochet’s Chile to Suharto’s 
Indonesia; sought to scuttle the International Criminal Court, the capstone 
of an enforceable global human rights regime; maintained practices—like 
capital punishment—at variance with the human rights standards of other 
democracies; engaged in unilateral preemptive military actions that other 
states believe violate the UN Charter; failed to ratify the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women; and ignored UN bodies when they 
criticized U.S. domestic rights practices.18 
 
Of course, many other countries have engaged in the same practices; what makes the 
United States exceptional is that it also is a global human rights leader. 
 
 There are in fact three strands of American exceptionalism. First, the United 
States negotiates human rights treaties but ratifies them subject to reservations that cut 
back on the scope of its obligations, fails to ratify them, or ratifies but violates them.  
 
 For instance, Ignatieff argues that the United States’ decision to attach conditions 
to its ratification to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a major 
human rights treaty, betrays exemptionalism.19 However, as Jack Goldsmith has pointed 
out, virtually all western states have acted similarly; usually it is the authoritarian states 
that do not bother to add reservations to human rights treaties which they then ignore.20 
Ignatieff also notes that when the United States ratifies human rights treaties, it typically 
provides that the provisions of the treaties are not binding as a matter of domestic law. 
However, this is a difference of form, not substance: because in many of these states 
international treaties do not enter domestic law without an independent legislative act, the 
use of explicit provisions saying as much are unnecessary. 
 
 So if the United States is exemptionalist in Ignatieff’s sense, then so are many 
other states. In fact, Ignatieff defines exemptionalism so broadly that it loses its meaning. 
In the narrow sense in which we use it, none of the examples discussed by Ignatieff count 
as exemptionalism, because in none of these examples did the United States claim that 
rules should apply to others and not to itself. What is distinctive about the United States 
is that it rejected rules favored by other states, refused to compromise, and instead argued 
that all states (including the United States itself) should be subject to the rules that the 
                                                            
18 Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 2. 
19 Id. at 5-6. 
20 Jack L. Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN 
BAG 2d 365 (1998). 
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United States preferred. This is classic exceptionalism, not exemptionalism. As we will 
see, other states engage in similar exceptionalist behavior. 
 Second, the United States condemns enemies for human rights violations that the 
United States itself commits, and turns a blind eye to friends who engage in the same 
behavior. This point has been made most forcefully in the international law literature by 
Harold Koh, who calls this type of exceptionalist behavior the use of double standards.21 
However, the use of double standards is not distinctive behavior of exceptionalist states. 
Indeed, double standards compromise exceptionalism: The exceptionalist state believes 
that its institutions embody the best rules and those rules should apply to all, equally.  
Double standards are better seen as the result of pragmatism (at best) or inconsistent 
preferences (at worst), and characterize the behavior of all states, not just exceptionalist 
states. A state that seeks to advance human rights finds that this policy conflicts with 
other interests—including trade and security. The state might be willing to compromise 
its ideals in order to satisfy the demands of interest groups, or inconsistent public 
preferences. It might believe that in some settings security will advance human rights 
more than a consistent line on human rights. When the United States applies double 
standards, it simply acts like any other state.22 
 
 Third, American courts do not pay much attention to foreign judicial rulings when 
interpreting U.S. constitutional law and, more generally, American constitutional norms 
are outside the international mainstream, or at least the mainstream of developed and 
democratic states.23 The judiciaries in foreign democracies are more likely to cite foreign 
courts than American courts are. And most states have constitutionalized positive or 
social rights—including rights to health care, to work, and to education—while the 
United States has not. Most democratic states have also rejected the death penalty and 
have weaker protections for speech and religious association than the United States does. 
This refusal to go along with other democratic states can be seen as another manifestation 
of American exceptionalism—here, within the realm of judicial behavior and 
constitutionalism. 
 
 Of course, not all states are democratic. A large minority of states are 
authoritarian, and many formally democratic states are either not democratic—the elites 
pull the strings behind the scenes—or are unstable, and cycle between democracy and 
dictatorship. The question arises why Ignatieff compares the United States to other 
democratic states, and indeed he clearly has in mind the major European democracies, 
plus Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, plus a handful of other places such as India 
and South Africa. These states amount to less than a quarter of the nearly 200 states in 
                                                            
21 Koh, supra note 2, at 1485-87. 
22 We will provide evidence with respect to Europe and China, infra, in Parts II and III. 
23 Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 4; Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1405-06. 
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existence. Ignatieff himself admits that he understands American exceptionalism against 
the practices of democratic states.24 
 
 After a survey of possible reasons for American exceptionalism, Ignatieff 
concludes that the most plausible explanation is that Americans are just not strongly 
committed to liberalism.25 Assuming his diagnosis is correct, here again Ignatieff does 
not pause to consider whether international law in fact embodies liberalism as he 
understands it—that is, liberalism understood on the European social-democratic model. 
The answer is surely no. Consider the top twenty most populous states in the world (in 
order): China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, 
Russia, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, Germany, Ethiopia, Egypt, Turkey, 
Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, France. Aside from the ambiguous case of the 
United States, only two states that embody European-style liberalism—Germany and 
France—make it on the list, and only in the second half of it. Most of the states—China, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Russia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Congo—are not 
liberal at all.26 Iran is an authoritarian theocracy. China, Vietnam, and Russia are also 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
 Only a person who identifies European norms with world norms could say that 
the United States’ wavering commitment to liberalism—if that is the case—explains its 
exceptionalism. This mistake—the confusion of European norms and universal 
international norms—is central to the claim of American exceptionalism. On this view, 
European norms reflect the universal norms of international law. We have not seen a 
defense of this view; it seems to be merely assumed.27 
                                                            
24 Id. at 4-5. 
25  Id. at 20. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 147, 150 (giving a related argument that 
emphasizes American institutions and institutional history). 
26 They are all classified as not free or partly free in Freedom House’s 2010 survey. See Freedom House, 
Freedom in the World 2010: Global Data,  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Tables_and_Graphs.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 
2010).  
27  See, e.g, Ignatieff, supra note 2; Rubenfeld, supra note 5 (describing European “universalism”). 
Rubenfeld emphasizes Europeans’ faith in “international consensus” as a source of legal validation and 
authority. He also explains how Europeans are committed to the “universalistic view” of constitutional law 
and international human rights law, favoring supranational legal and political institutions because “most 
important legal and political principles […] transcend national boundaries and indeed exists to check 
national governments.” See id. at 1975-76, 2005-06. Peters, supra note 2, describes American 
exceptionalism against a background of global constitutional values that look suspiciously European. See 
also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 113, 117 (2005) (“We Europeans share this intuition: the international world will be how we are. And 
we read international law in the image of our domestic legalism.”); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED 
WEST 161 (2006) (describing Europeans’ continuing commitment to the Kantian cosmopolitan order and 
contrasting that with American preference for hegemonic liberalism post 9/11). 
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C. Multiple Exceptionalisms 
 
 Against the conventional wisdom, we propose an alternative hypothesis. We 
argue that great powers typically advance a view of international law that embodies their 
own normative commitments but are presented as universal commitments. During the 
cold war, there were two exceptional states—the United States and the Soviet Union—
and each advanced a universalistic vision of international law. Today, there are three 
exceptional states—the United States, the EU, 28  and China—and each advances a 
distinctive vision of international law. 
 
 American exceptionalism. The United States believes that international law should 
promote free markets and liberal democracy. Military force may be used by any country 
against threats to this order. 
 
 European exceptionalism. Europeans believe that international law should 
advance human rights (including positive or economic rights) and social welfare. 
Europeans reject the unilateral use of military force. Instead of resorting to military force, 
states should pool their sovereignty in international institutions that can resolve disputes. 
 
 Chinese exceptionalism. China takes the strictest line on sovereignty and contests 
the use of military force against independent states. China also believes that international 
law should impose less burdensome obligations on poor countries. According to China, 
economic growth (at least, in poor countries) should take precedence over human rights. 
 
 The core of international law consists of the overlapping claims of these three 
states. “Unexceptional” (or what we will call “normal”) countries usually do not bother to 
advance distinctive visions of international law because they do not have the power to 
affect the development of international law. These states mostly take the law as given and 
try to modify it along the margin to suit their interests. There are some exceptions. In the 
nineteenth century, the United States, while it was still weak, advanced a distinctive view 
of international law, which may have influenced the development of international law.29 
More often, weaker countries form blocs that advance a distinctive vision. For instance, 
the non-aligned block that was active during the cold war has fallen in line behind China, 
which by virtue of its power and size, is the natural leader of poorer countries. Brazil has 
emerged as the leader of the G20, a coalition of the developing countries in the WTO, 
which advances the developing country stance in the WTO negotiations with notable 
collective clout. In addition, exceptional states often try to persuade normal states to sign 
                                                            
28 The EU is not technically a state and would better be described a quasi-state. However, we will refer to it 
as a state for simplicity. 
29 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 52. 
12 
 
on to their particular exceptionalist view. The United States championed the negative 
rights embedded in the ICCPR and the former Soviet Union championed the positive 
rights embedded in the ICESCR; both examples reveal two exceptional states trying to 
convince normal states to adopt their respective worldviews.30 Similarly, the EU often 
requires normal states to subscribe to the EU’s vision of international law as a condition 
for signing a trade agreement or acceding to the EU.  
 
 In the remainder of this paper, we will flesh out these arguments. For each state, 
we will (1) describe its distinctive international legal vision; (2) explain the source of this 
vision in domestic public opinion and institutional structure; and (3) show that states are 
exceptional in the same way that the United States is exceptional. 
 
II. EUROPEAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE PACIFIST SOCIAL WELFARE MODEL 
 
A. European Exceptionalism Defined 
 
1. Human Rights  
 
The EU maintains a strong commitment to international human rights. Because all 
EU members have ratified all of the major international human rights treaties, one might 
think that the EU’s position on human rights reflects universal values. However, the EU’s 
position is distinctive. The EU has its own Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, which 
in turn reflects in part human rights norms developed by the European Court of Justice. 
These norms are, in fact, broader than those embodied in international treaties; they also 
vary in some respects from the norms advanced by the other major states.  
 
The most distinctive human rights commitment of the EU is its opposition to 
capital punishment.31 The EU has sponsored multiple resolutions at the UN Commission 
of Human Rights32 and at the UN General Assembly,33 calling for a moratorium or 
                                                            
30 MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221-29 (2004). 
31 Article 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights provides, “Everyone has the right to life” and, 
“No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.” See Charter of Fundamental Human Rights 
of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. All EU member states have signed the 13th Protocol of the 
2003 European Convention of Human Rights, which commits the signatories to the permanent abolition of 
death penalty in all circumstances.  
32 See, e.g., U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., 66th mtg. at  
7–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.66 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/136/03/PDF/G0013603.pdf; U.N. Economic and Social 
Council, Commission on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶¶ 38–44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.58 
(Oct. 19, 1999), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/132/70/PDF/G9913270.pdf. 
33 See, e.g., Memorandum by the European Union at the 54th United Nations General Assembly 10 (Sept. 
21, 1999), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/memo_en_99.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 
2009); European Union, EU Welcomes UN Vote Calling for a Global Moratorium on the Death Penalty, 
EU/NR 118/07 (Nov. 16, 2007),  
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outright abolition of capital punishment. The EU also discourages the death penalty 
through its bilateral relations: It has criticized the US for including reservations in 
international human rights treaties to preserve the death penalty,34 and filed amicus curiae 
briefs in cases where the US Supreme Court has considered the suitability of capital 
punishment for juvenile or mentally retarded criminal offendants.35 The EU has further 
required the US to sign a treaty guaranteeing that it will not seek death penalty in murder 
cases which involve a request for extradition from an EU member state.36 
 
But not all of the EU’s positions on human rights are so broad. The American 
commitment to freedom of speech and political association is stronger than the European 
view. European human rights norms do not prohibit the suppression of parties and certain 
types of derogatory speech protected by the American first amendment. Some American 
criminal law protections (such as the exclusionary rule) have no counterpart in European 
courts. As we will discuss later, China endorses a much stronger right to development 
than the EU does. On China’s view, poor countries may abrogate other rights for the sake 
of alleviating poverty and maintaining order; the EU does not believe that the right to 
development can trump civil and political rights. While Europeans would argue that 
China is simply giving less weight to those other rights than it should, a more accurate 
description is that there is disagreement as to the relative weights of the right to 
development and other rights when they conflict. 
 
At times the EU’s commitment to human rights conflicts with its international law 
obligations. In 2001, the Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, an organ of the UN 
Security Council, placed the Saudi businessman Yassin Abdullah Kadi on a list of 
individuals associated with Al Qaida. Under the Security Council resolution that 
established the Sanctions Committee in 1999, all states have a legal obligation to freeze 
the assets of the individuals on the Sanctions Committee’s list, including Kadi. The EU 
adopted a regulation to implement the UN resolutions that called for the freezing of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=58 (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2009). 
34 See European Union, EU Demarche on the Death Penalty, Presented to the US Administration, arts. 6–7 
(May 10, 2001), 
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1959&Itemid=26.  
35  European Commission, Background: EU Policy against the Death Penalty 2 (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.eurunion.org/DPBackground-9-08.doc (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 
129 S. Ct. 290 (2008); Brief for the European Union and Members of the International Community as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Maharaj v. McDonough, 549 U.S. 1072 (2006); Brief for the European 
Union and Members of the International Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
36 John R. Schmidt, The EU Campaign against the Death Penalty, 49(4) SURVIVAL 123, 127 (2007–2008). 
See Peter Finn, Germany Reluctant to Aid Prosecution of Moussaoui, WASH. POST, June 11, 2002, at A1 
(reporting on Germany’s threat to withhold evidence if the accused, Moussaoui, may be punished with the 
death penalty). 
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terrorist funds, including those of Kadi.37 Kadi subsequently challenged this regulation 
before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). In 2008, the ECJ ruled that the Sanctions 
Committee’s designation of Kadi did not bind the EU’s member states.38 The process 
established by the Sanctions Committee offended fundamental human rights norms under 
European law. Kadi did not have an adequate opportunity to challenge the placing of his 
name on the Committee’s list, the ECJ held. Accordingly, European countries could not 
freeze Kadi’s assets without violating Kadi’s due process rights and, consequently, 
European law.  
 
The ECJ’s judgment (indirectly) challenged provisions of international law aimed 
against a major problem of international security and undermined the authority of the UN 
Security Council.  Declaring that “the obligations imposed by an international agreement 
cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty,”39 the 
ECJ elevated the human rights guarantees enshrined in EC Treaties and general principles 
of European law above the UN-generated norms to fight terrorism.40 This was perceived 
as a departure from the EU’s customary role as a staunch supporter of international law 
and the integrity of the UN.41  
 
2. Social Welfare  
 
The EU has sought to maintain a high level of what it calls “social protection,” 
sometimes at the expense of its international law obligations. The EU insists on its right 
to keep foreign products out of its market on grounds of food safety and other health 
policy concerns, precaution in the field of biotechnology, cultural diversity and other 
social welfare rights, even when doing so violates EU’s obligations under international 
trade law.42  
 
                                                            
37 Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9 (EC). 
38 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the EU, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, at ¶ 5, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML. 
39 Id. at ¶ 5. 
40 See id. The ECJ went on to add that even though the EU constitutional norms and the UN Charter exist 
on a separate plane (consistent with the dualist view of international law), if they were to be classified 
within the same hierarchy of norms within the EU’s legal order, UN Charter would be subordinate to the 
EC Treaties and the general principles of law. See id. at ¶¶ 305–08. 
41 Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi, at 4–5, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1321313 (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). Joined Cases C-
402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the EU, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, at ¶ 38 
(Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/c2_juris.htm (follow “C-402/05 P” 
hyperlink; then follow “”C-402/05 P” hyperlink next to “Opinion”).  
42 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, The European Union as a conflicted trade power, 13 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL. 906, 922 (2006). 
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The EU’s pursuit of social policies that conflict with trade liberalization has led to 
challenges in the WTO. Most prominent, the EU’s social welfare objectives clashed with 
its WTO obligations when the EU sought to prohibit the importation of hormone-treated 
beef into the EU. Following a complaint from the US, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
ruled that the EU’s ban was not based on scientific evidence, and hence not justified 
under the relevant WTO rules.43 Similarly, the EU sought to restrict US, Argentine, and 
Canadian imports of agricultural and food products that contained genetically modified 
organisms (“GMOs”). The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel found the EU’s restrictions 
were contrary to its obligations under the WTO.44 Despite these rulings against the EU, 
the EU has remained reluctant to modify its domestic policies, preferring to violate 
international trade law and endure WTO-authorized trade sanctions.  
 
Trade conditionality offers an effective instrument for the EU to export its social 
welfare model abroad.45 In derogation from the principle of most-favored-nation (non-
discrimination among trading partners), the WTO allows developed countries to set up 
preferential tariff schedules to developing countries under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). The EU uses its GSP system to foster its preferred social policies in 
the beneficiary countries: It rewards countries that ratify the main international 
conventions on human rights, labor standards and sustainable development and punishes 
countries that do not. 46  For instance, in 1997 the EU withdrew Myanmar’s GSP 
privileges because of Myanmar’s forced labor practices. Similarly, Belarus lost its GSP 
status in 2007 for persistent violations of labor rights, including rights to organize and to 
engage in collective bargaining.47 The United States similarly uses the GSP scheme to 
advance its distinctive view of international law. Thus, resorting to trade conditionality as 
an instrument to advance one’s exceptionalist agenda is not a prerogative of a single 
state—yet the set of values that the GSP scheme is used to promote differs depending on 
the identity of the exceptionalist state that extends conditional preferences to its trade 
partners.  
 
                                                            
43  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2009); Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
44  Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, at Part VIII, §§ 8.14, 8.18, 8.34, 8.38 (Sept. 29, 
2006). 
45 Meunier, supra note 42, at 913. 
46 Jan Vanderberghe, On Carrots and Sticks: The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policy, 13 EUR. FOREIGN 
AFF. REV. 561, 570 (2008). 
47 Id. (citing European Commission, Promoting core labour standards: Commission grants additional tariff 
preferences to Sri Lanka and initiates an inquiry into labour rights violations in Belarus (Jan. 7, 2004), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/january/tradoc_115531.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2009)). 
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3. Pooling Sovereignty  
 
The EU sees itself as the “frontrunner” and the “driving force” behind 
international institutions.48 The countries that would later form or join the EU (aside from 
Germany and other members of the defeated Axis) played an essential role in establishing 
the post-WWII institutions, including the UN, the WTO and the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The European Union itself is the outcome of sovereignty-sharing among its 
27 members. While the EU does not have a common police force to enforce its law, its 
member states have submitted to authentic legislative, judicial, and executive institutions 
that issue legally binding orders that are routinely obeyed. A trope of EU public relations 
is that if historic enemies on the European continent can pool sovereignty, then so can 
countries throughout the world. 
 
The Europeans also pooled their sovereignty by establishing a Council of Europe 
whose membership extends to 47 countries and thus beyond the member states of the EU. 
The Council of Europe seeks to advance democratic principles and human rights 
throughout Europe based on the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).49 
The Council of Europe also established a European Court of Human Rights, vested with a 
jurisdiction to hear allegations of violations of the ECHR. Similarly, the EU has 
participates enthusiastically in the UN human rights committees, forums, conferences,50 
and has pursued numerous initiatives in the context of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. 
 
The EU was also a prime supporter of the International Criminal Court.  All 27 
members of the European Union have joined the ICC, including those states which 
                                                            
48 European Commission, Communication, The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of 
multilateralism, at § 1.1, COM (2003) 526 final (Sept. 10, 2003); see also European Commission, 
Summary: The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r0000
9_en.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
49 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol 
No. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-
dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf.  The rights and freedoms secured by the ECHR 
include, e.g., the right to life (abolishment of death penalty), the right to a fair hearing, the right to privacy, 
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the protection of property. The 
ECHR prohibits, e.g., torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, forced labour, arbitrary 
and unlawful detention, and discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms secured by the 
Convention. 
50 These forums and conferences include, for instance, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly, the Commission on the Situation of Women, the World Conference 
against Racism of 2001, the UN General Assembly Special Session on Children of 2002. The EU is also 
active in supporting the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). See European Commission, 
Communication, The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, at § 1.1, 
COM (2003) 526 final (Sept. 10, 2003) supra. 
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needed to amend their constitutions in order to do so.51 The Rome Statute is among the 
numerous multilateral treaties that the EU requires states to sign as a condition for 
acceding to the EU.52  The EU also encourages ratification of the Rome Statute outside of 
its immediate sphere of influence through accession, including sponsoring annual UN 
Resolutions supporting the ICC.53  
 
4. Presumptive Pacifism  
 
The EU is skeptical about the use of military force. It sees itself as a “soft,” 
“moral” or “normative” power that relies on its influence rather than force in maintaining 
world peace. 54  European security strategy therefore calls for preventative efforts—
including the spreading of democratic ideals, human rights and reduction of poverty—as 
means to peace and security.55 The EU describes “the distinctive European approach” to 
international peace and security as follows:  
 
[The EU has] worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and 
inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting 
                                                            
51 ICC—States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2009); see Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 273, 278 (2000) (noting that Germany and France amended their constitutions to adhere to the 
ICC statute). 
52 See EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, CONSILIUM: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT §§ 2, 2.5 (Feb. 2008), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf 
(explaining that “[a]chieving the widest participation in the Rome Statute was also an EU objective during 
the enlargement negotiations and accession phases of the new EU Member States”); see, e.g., European 
Communities, Consilium: The European Union and the International Criminal Court § 2.1 (Nov. 2007) 
(lauding Croatia’s support for the ICC and highlighting the EU’s commitment to furthering universal 
acceptance of the ICC); cf. Council Common Position on the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), 
2003/444/CFSP, 2003 O.J. (L 150) 67 (EC). 
53 See EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, CONSILIUM: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT § 2.5 (Feb. 2008), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf; U.N. 
GAOR, 63rd Sess., 45th plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.45 (Nov. 11, 2008); U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 
57th plen. mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.57 (Nov. 26, 2007); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 56th plen. mtg. at 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.56 (Nov. 20, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 53rd plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. 
A/60/PV.53 (Nov. 23, 2005). 
54 See Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union 273/01 § I (Dec. 15, 2001) (“[The EU is a] 
power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries 
but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to 
anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.”). See generally Ian Manners, Normative Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 235 (2002). 
55 COMMISSION REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 4, 9, S407/08 
(Dec. 11, 2008), available at  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf; COMMISSION 
REPORT, A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD, EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 6, 10 (Dec. 12, 2003), 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf; An example of this strategy is 
the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which grants duty-free and quota-free access to all 
exports, excluding arms and munitions, from the least developing countries. See Meunier, supra note 42, at 
917; Council Regulation 416/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 60) 43 (EC) [“EBA initiative”]. 
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development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. 
The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term 
engagement is required for lasting stabilization […] These achievements 
are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security 
policy.56 
 
The core of the European Security Strategy is that military force should only be used as a 
last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted.  The EU also rejects the 
preventive war doctrine, and insists that the UN Security Council authorization must be 
secured before force is deployed. 
 
Despite the pacifist rhetoric, individual EU member states have engaged in 
military operations in recent years—for example, in the war in Afghanistan, which was 
authorized by the Security Council. EU members have even used military force without 
international legal justification.  The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 violated 
international law because it did not serve any country’s defensive purposes, and it was 
not authorized by the UN Security Council. Although France and Germany opposed the 
invasion, the UK, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (in addition to a 
number of European countries that acceded to the EU the year following the Iraq 
invasion) contributed troops to the mission. In 1999, all of the European members of 
NATO, plus France, went to war against Serbia, again under the leadership of the US. 
The intervention violated international law: it was not a war of self-defense and it lacked 
Security Council authorization. NATO characterized the military operation as a 
humanitarian intervention that was designed to stop the ethnic cleansing Serbs 
orchestrated against Albanians in Kosovo.57 The military alliance stepped in when an 
individual state (Serbia)—and subsequently the UN Security Council—failed to 
discharge their responsibilities to protect individuals amid an exceptionally grave, 
unfolding humanitarian catastrophe.58 
 
There are two important observations here. First, the European view on the 
legality of the use of force is distinctive. The dominant view among the European 
countries is that military force should be used only as a last resort, ideally (although not 
necessarily) with Security Council authorization, and in the service of humanitarian 
                                                            
56 COMMISSION REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 55, 
at 2. 
57 Transcript of March 25, 1999 Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR, 
Gen. Wesley Clark, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). Javier 
Solana, then the Secretary General of NATO and now the High Representative of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, justified the bombing as necessary to “stop further humanitarian catastrophe.” 
58 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
xi-xiii (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (giving a synopsis of the 
principles of R2P and the guidelines for determining whether military intervention is justified). 
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ideals—a point emphasized by Tony Blair in justifying British participation in the Iraq 
war, and made more generally during the Kosovo intervention. The U.S. and Chinese 
views, as we will see, differ. Second, the EU has been willing to assert aggressive 
interpretations of international law in order to justify their position. Thus, the idea that 
“humanitarian intervention” could be legally justified even without Security Council 
authorization emerged during the Kosovo intervention. 
 
B. Explaining European Exceptionalism 
 
1. Domestic Policy Preferences: Social Welfare, Human Rights, and Pacifism 
 
European public opinion supports the “social market economy,” a compromise 
between socialism and laissez-faire capitalism that features a generous safety net, some 
industrial policy, strong unions, and more intrusive market regulation than one finds in 
the United States. 59  Of course, the United States and nearly every other developed 
country similarly supplies a minimum safety net and regulates the market. But the faith in 
the role of the government as the provider of social welfare seems to be a more central 
part of the European identity than it is in most other western countries. 
 
These commitments are reflected in the EU’s trade policy. Although critics allege 
that the EU’s breach of WTO rules in the cases of beef hormones and GMOs reflect 
protectionism,60 and without doubt the European producers of hormone- and GMO-free 
products benefit from the EU’s insistence that free trade must occasionally yield to health 
concerns,61 the EU has asserted that it is merely responding to European consumers’ 
                                                            
59 This is often referred to as an “embedded liberalism” compromise. See John G. Ruggie, John Gerard, 
International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 
36 INT’L ORG. 379, 392 (1982); See generally GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF 
WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990). 
60 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, supra note 44, at §§ 4.152–53, 4.173–4.180 (outlining the U.S. argument before the 
WTO, which contrasted the EU’s purported purpose of maintaining food safety with the discriminatory 
effects of the food safety regulations); Benedetto Della Bedova, Opinion: Bio-Fueling a Trade War, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, available at  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574328533995657764.html (giving one former 
European Parliament member’s opinion that the EU uses environmental protections to disguise 
protectionism). 
61 European cattle farmers do not use hormones in raising cattle whereas the US beef producers give 
hormones to ninety percent of their cattle. See Frode Alfnes & Kyrre Rickertsen, European Consumers’ 
Acceptance of US Hormone-Treated Beef, 3(3) EUROCHOICES 18 (2004). Similarly, by restricting the 
importation of GMO-products to Europe, the EU’s measures adversely affect the US, Argentina, Brazil and 
Canada, which cultivate ninety percent of the GMOs and food containing GMOs worldwide. Europe’s rules 
on GMOs and the WTO (Feb. 7, 2006),  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/61&format=PDF&aged=1&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Aug. 18, 2009); see also WTO panel rules EU GMO moratorium 
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concerns about food safety. Public sentiment within the EU is skeptical of GMOs and 
hormones in food. A 2006 survey of European consumers revealed that 62% of the 
respondents across the EU were “worried” about the food safety risks posed by GMOs.62 
A similar opinion poll from 2001 showed 71% of the Europeans do not want GMOs in 
their food.63 Regarding hormones, a 1998 Eurobarometer survey shows that 54% of those 
surveyed indicated it important for food safety that food was “100% free from 
hormones.”64  These surveys show that the import-competing industries are not alone in 
urging the EU to violate WTO law when social policy considerations so warrant. 
 
Turning to reasons behind EU’s human rights advocacy and presumptive 
pacifism, Europe’s recent history of wars and violence stands prominently among them. 
The extreme nationalism and the brutality of two world wars implanted revulsion for war 
and engrained the ideals of human dignity and pacifism deep within the European 
mindset. The legacy of wars and violence has heightened the EU’s concern for human 
rights. For instance, large-scale state-sanctioned violence that the Europeans endured 
partly explains why the opposition to the death penalty is the paramount concern in EU’s 
external human rights policy.65 
 
These experiences have also caused the EU to largely refrain from using military 
force and pursue peaceful means to solve international disputes. The EU has not 
established a European army. Rather, it considers itself a “civilian power” that pre-empts 
military conflicts through institutional engagement and diplomacy. This explains why 
most EU countries did not share the United States’ concerns about joining the ICC: states 
that are frequently engaged in military operations abroad are aware that their soldiers 
might one day be forced to stand a trial before the ICC. This threat was not significant for 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
illegal (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/wto-panel-rules-eu-gmo-moratorium-
illegal/article-152341 (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).  
62  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 238: Risk Issues 47 (Feb. 2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_238_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).  
63  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROBAROMETER 55.2: Europeans, science, and technology 40 (Dec. 
2001), http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2001/pr0612en-report.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
64 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROBAROMETRE 49: La Securite des Produits Alimentaires 15 (Sept. 3, 
1998), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/surveys/eb49_fr.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2009); 
see also Jayson L. Lusk, Jutta Roosen, & John A. Fox, Demand for Beef from Cattle Administered Growth 
Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn: A Comparison of Consumers in France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, 85 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 16, 23 (2003) (reporting that, on a scale of 
1 (not concerned) to 5 (very concerned), French, German and UK consumers reported average levels of 
concern of 4.54, 4.38 and 4.20 regarding the use of hormones in livestock production). 
65 See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97, 126–27 
(2002). The death penalty was outlawed in several European countries in the immediate aftermath of the 
WWII, following the wave of executions of innocent civilians without a trial. Other European countries 
kept capital punishment on their books but refrained from enforcing the punishment. See Schmidt, supra 
note 36, at 125. 
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most EU states, which are rarely involved in international military conflicts.66 Only the 
UK and France, both with extensive military capacities, initially expressed reservations 
about the ICC but assented to the other EU members’ joint position in the end.67 
 
This explanation of the presumptive pacifism of Europe should not, however, be 
taken too far. Britain and France used considerable violence to prevent the loss of their 
colonies after World War II. Britain fought a war in Malaysia. France fought wars in 
Indochina and North Africa. Both countries participated in an ill-fated attack on Egypt in 
1956. Despite the absence of a European army, all the major European countries have 
maintained large armies. They participated in the 1999 Kosovo War, the 1991 Gulf War, 
the war in Afghanistan, and (many of them, above all Britain) the 2003 Iraq War. 
European countries also did not make the promotion of democracy and human rights a 
priority in international relations until relatively recently—at best, the last two decades.  
 
Thus, European pacifism is a rational response to the current global distribution of 
military power as it is a reflection of a European ideology. Europeans remain hostile 
towards unilateral use of force simply because Europeans have no capacity to engage in 
unilateral military action themselves. 68  Insisting on multilateralism ensures that 
Europeans have a vote on whether and when US troops are dispatched to fight for 
international peace and security. The relatively benign U.S. hegemony (in European eyes) 
also enables Europeans to embrace pacifism: as long as the United States keeps the world 
peace, Europe does not need spend money on armies and take the risks of war. 69 
Europeans are content with watching from the sidelines when Americans engage in wars, 
preferring to expand their social welfare system with the funds they save while abstaining 
from the role of a global policeman. 
 
2. Institutional Structure 
 
The European countries have had disproportionate influence over the creation of 
current multilateral institutions. The voting power in the existing institutions, including 
the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, reflects the distribution of power in the world 
following WWII: The EU member states hold two of the five permanent and two of the 
ten nonpermanent seats in the UN Security Council. Similarly, the EU (together with the 
US) wields disproportionate influence in the IMF and the World Bank. In light of this, 
the EU’s enthusiasm for preserving existing institutional cooperation is hardly surprising. 
 
                                                            
66 See Rabkin, supra note 51, at 279. 
67 Id. 
68 Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL. REV. 3, 14 (2002).  
69 See, e.g., id. at 8. 
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The EU has been successful in incorporating its vision into many multilateral 
arrangements, including treaties as diverse as the TRIPs Agreement, Landmines treaty, 
the Rome Statute, and the Kyoto Protocol. The EU’s “hybrid” institutional structure helps 
the EU to shape international agreements and institutions towards its preferences.70 The 
EU often bargains as a single entity, enjoying the leverage of the biggest trading block in 
the world.71 However, when it comes time to vote, the EU casts 27 votes on the matter. 
The EU can also refrain from making commitments, using the argument that the 
European Commission negotiates as a constrained agent of the member states.72  For 
instance, the Commission can resist demands to remove agricultural protection by saying 
that it cannot secure the backing of the French farmers for the proposal. Presenting the 
“French problem” as an “EU problem,” the French farmers’ demands suddenly enjoy the 
bargaining power of a trading block speaking on behalf of 500 million consumers.73 The 
EU may therefore be more eager to join an international agreement than other states 
because its bargaining tactics give member nations more power to affect the agreement’s 
content.  
 
The EU’s own experience with integration may explain why the EU strongly 
advocates the pooling of sovereignty internationally. The long experience with 
integration in Europe has eroded the rhetorical power of “sovereignty”—the notion, 
deeply entrenched in the United States and China that any loss of authority to 
supranational institutions is an intolerable affront to the dignity of a state. The EU also 
considers itself to be a thriving example of how international conflicts can be overcome 
and how countries can peacefully co-exist and prosper. As we discuss below, in 
comparing the EU to the United States, European countries have a less populist form of 
democracy than the United States does, and so lacks populist skepticism of remote 
bureaucracies.74 European experience with fascism in the Second World War left the 
Europeans skeptical of popular democracy. An important function of international law is 
therefore to act as an antinationalist force by checking national sovereignty and guarding 
                                                            
70 See generally Meunier, supra note 42 (discussing how the EU is a power in trade and through trade). 
71 See id. at 908. Currently there are 27 members in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom. Member states of the EU,  
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
72 Meunier, supra note 42, at 909. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The 
Logic of Two-level Games, 42 INT’L ORG 427, 434 (1988) (explaining two-level bargaining when a 
constrained agent negotiates on behalf of a principal).  
73 Rabkin, supra note 51, at 275. 
74 Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1975 (2004) (contrasting 
American “democratic constitutionalism with European “international constitutionalism”).  
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states against “democratic excess.” 75  As a result, there is less popular resistance in 
Europe to delegation of authority to international agencies. 
 
Finally, the EU advocates strong multilateral institutions, in particular security 
institutions, because of its own limited ability to engage in unilateralism. While the EU 
member states have pooled their sovereignty on many issues of economic importance, the 
common foreign and security policy of the EU is limited. Any decision relating to 
security policy is subject to the requirement of unanimity among the 27 member states. 
There is also no common European military force that can be dispatched to intervene in 
international conflicts. Insisting on obtaining UN Security Council authorization for the 
use of military force thus rarely constrains the EU’s own military ambitious yet gives its 
important member states, France and the United Kingdom, a right to a veto any attempt 
by the United States to exercise force unilaterally. Thus, as long as the EU continues to 
lack a strong, unified European military force, it is likely to prefer constraining other 
exceptionalist states’ unilateralism thorough the disproportionate influence it wields in 
the UN Security Council. 
 
III. CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM: MINIMALIST DEVELOPMENTALISM 
 
A. Chinese Exceptionalism Defined 
 
1. Strict Sovereignty  
 
China’s vision of international law rests on the principle of sovereignty. Under the 
Chinese view, sovereign states have an inalienable right to exercise jurisdiction over their 
territories and their people without interference from other states.76 The internal affairs of 
a state are left for the state’s own people to govern; international affairs are decided by 
consultation among states acting on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.77 While the 
integrated global economy inevitably compromises states’ economic sovereignty, 
                                                            
75 Id. at 1986-87, 2006.  
76 Over the years, China has continued to assert that its sovereignty extends to Taiwan, which it considers to 
be a province, under its “one China” policy. Chinese government is the sole representative of China. 
Because of this, China has blocked Taiwan from joining the UN as a member and impeded Taiwan’s ability 
to enter into relations with other states. Foreign governments’ attempts to engage directly with Taiwan have 
provoked strong reactions in Beijing: When the United States announced its intention to sell advanced 
weapons to Taiwan in 2001, China protested by stating that the weapons deal would violate the Sino-US 
open communiqué and infringe China’s territorial sovereignty. See Björn Ahl, China, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW § C.3, available at  
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1876&recno=24&letter=C. 
77 Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Address at the Rally 
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (June 28, 2004), in 3 
Chinese J. Int’l L. 363, 365–66 (2004), available at  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronfiveprinciples/t140777.htm. 
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military, political, and cultural sovereignty remain inviolable. 78  Consequently, China 
rejects all perceived attempts to undermine its sovereignty, including criticism of its 
human right policies.79  
 
China bases its vision of international law on the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence,” which were first established in an agreement between China and India in 
1954. These principles are “mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
other states; mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.” 80 Since then, these 
principles have become a guiding doctrine of international relations for Chinese 
scholars.81 Of these principles, the most elemental under the Chinese view is the principle 
of sovereignty.82 In commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles in 2004, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao referred to sovereignty as “the birthmark of any 
independent state, the crystallization of its national interests and the best safeguard of all 
it holds dear.”83 
 
As a part of its efforts to promote a world order based on the principle of 
sovereignty, China accords strong authority to the UN Charter and the Security Council.84 
Qian Qichen, former foreign minister of China, gave special emphasis to the UN’s role in 
maintaining a pluralist world, describing the UN as the “most universal, representative, 
and authoritative international organization in the world.”85 Moreover, Qian called on 
states to uphold the UN’s authority and acknowledge the dominant role of the Security 
Council in conducing international affairs.86  
 
China has applied this view of international law to maintain its position that 
human rights concerns do not trump the principle of sovereignty. China regularly defies 
the UN’s, foreign countries’, and NGOs’ criticisms of its human rights record.87 It resists 
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87 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Statement By H.E. Ambassador 
Qiao Zhonghuai, Head of the Chineses Delegation, Before the Vote on the Draft Resolution Entitled 
"Situation of Human Rights in China" at the 56th Session of the Commission on Human Rights (April 18, 
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the western concept of human rights as incompatible with its non-western and non-
democratic society. Under this view, advancement of norms relating to human rights and 
democratic governance presumes a hierarchy of civilizations, and leads to an imposition 
of one’s culture and values on others.  
 
China has also opposed UN human rights resolutions against individual countries, 
fearing that such resolutions are primarily tools to exert political pressure on developing 
countries.88 In January 2007, for instance, China used its veto in the UN Security Council 
to block a resolution denouncing human right violations in Myanmar. In doing so, it 
argued that the UN Charter grants the Security Council authority to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a state only if there is a threat to international peace and security. This 
criterion, according to China, was not met in case of Myanmar. 89  Similarly, China 
opposed a proposed Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in 
Kosovo in 1998, asserting that the Kosovo matter was an internal affair of the state.90   
 
The United States and European Union have challenged China’s non-intervention 
policy and called on China to support responsible humanitarian intervention. Recently, 
China has—slowly and reluctantly—backed away from its earlier stance that state 
sovereignty can never be compromised on humanitarian grounds.91 Concerned over its 
international reputation, China reversed its position on Myanmar and supported a 
subsequent UN Security Council statement condemning Myanmar’s violent suppression 
of peaceful demonstrators in the fall of 2007.92 China also pressed Sudan to accept the 
UN and African Union peacekeepers in Darfur.93 Still, it is unlikely that China will depart 
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from its non-interference principle except in exceptional circumstances.94 China’s official 
position on humanitarian intervention continues to be a minimalist one: intervention is 
justified only in response to a target state’s request to intervene, and only if UN 
authorization is first secured.95  
 
The principle of sovereignty also dominates China’s position toward the ICC. The 
ICC Treaty grants the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals for genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, provided that those individuals’ own states are unwilling or 
unable to investigate or prosecute the case. This precondition, called the 
“complementarity principle,” dissuaded China from signing the Treaty in the end, even 
though it participated in the treaty negotiations. China maintained that “jurisdictional 
sovereignty of states should be strengthened rather than compromised.”96 China opposed 
the complementarity principle on the grounds that the ICC’s decision to pronounce a state 
unable or unwilling to prosecute a case could be politically motivated.  In refusing to 
expose its domestic criminal justice system to a possible review by the ICC,97 China 
confirmed that state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference are the key 
ordering principles of its vision of international law.  
 
2. Developmentalism  
 
Even with China’s emphasis on the principle of sovereign equality, China does 
not envision that all sovereign states should have equal rights and responsibilities.  
Instead, the Chinese view maintains that states’ international obligations ought to be 
adjusted to their different stages of development and their unequal capacities to comply 
with international law. For the Chinese, the right to development is a fundamental 
principle of international law. Developed countries are in a better position to maintain 
international order.98 Consequently, they must accept more burdensome obligations in 
providing public goods, including a clean environment or liberal trade order. In contrast, 
developing countries are entitled to various exceptions that reflect their lesser abilities to 
assume international obligations.  Accordingly, China advances a vision of international 
law that is grounded on the idea of fairness and redistribution.   
 
This developmental perspective guides China’s position on international 
environmental law. When negotiating states’ responsibilities to reduce greenhouse gas 
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emissions under the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol, China supported the Convention but resisted the imposition of binding 
obligations on developing countries. According to China, developed countries should 
bear the primary responsibility for global environmental protection due to their higher 
level of industrialization and, consequently, their disproportionate contribution to climate 
change. Developed countries also have the resources to invest in technologies that enable 
them to reduce the harm caused on the environment. China’s position, which ultimately 
prevailed, reflects the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”—
“common,” because climate change entails risks that affect all states; “differentiated,” to 
suggest that not all states have to contribute equally in reducing or eliminating those 
mutual risks. Instead, this view stresses that wealthier states should assume a greater 
share of the burden of fighting the climate change.99 While promulgating its commitment 
to (non-binding) emission cut targets during the 2009 Copenhagen climate change 
negotiations, China continued to insist that developed countries must assume the 
leadership role in fighting climate change.100  
 
Similarly, in the WTO, China supports the principle of special and differential 
treatment, which allows for various exceptions and preferences for developing countries. 
For instance, developing countries benefit from an “enabling clause” that 
permits derogations to the non-discriminatory treatment in favor of developing 
countries. 101  The enabling clause therefore forms an exception to the principle of 
reciprocity, which calls for the exchange of balanced concessions among states. In 
practice, this means that developed countries extend preferential tariff schedules to 
developing countries without offering the same concessions to their other (developed 
country) trading partners. Nor do developing countries need to open their domestic 
markets to the same extent as developed countries.102  Developing countries are also 
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eligible for transitional periods to allow them to adjust to surges in foreign imports, and 
to technical assistance to help them implement new WTO commitments. 
  
China’s approach to international human rights also follows the logic of 
developmentalism. According to Chinese policy, the key human right is the right to 
development, which trumps all other rights in the hierarchy of the human rights 
discourse.103 Civil and political rights have to yield, when necessary, to the larger goal of 
economic development.104  The Chinese view on human rights also emphasizes collective 
rights over individual rights. Human rights are not understood to be inalienable rights that 
precede the existence of the state.  Rather, China emphasizes that human rights derive 
from the State, which can grant those rights, subject to conditions.105 Since human rights 
derive from the State, China argues, nations will vary in their understanding of human 
rights based on their national traditions and level of economic development. For China, 
human rights is a concept steeped in cultural and economic relativism; there is no such 
thing as a universal human right.  
 
China’s pursuit of redistribution of power and wealth from North to South is 
characteristic of the developing countries’ decades-strong trend of calling for special 
treatment and more equitable division of wealth. In the 1970s and 1980s, developing 
countries advanced proposals for a “New International Economic Order” (“NIEO”) 
through the United Nations. This culminated in the adoption of the Resolution for a 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States by the UN General Assembly in 
1974.106 The idea behind the NIEO and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was 
to offer an alternative to the western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions and revise the 
international economic system in favor of developing countries. Arguing that they 
deserved restitution for the economic and social costs of colonization, developing 
countries demanded trade concessions and more generous foreign aid than they had 
received in the past.107 They also demanded the right to expropriate foreign property 
without paying full compensation. While China was never able to claim restitution 
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relating to colonization, it follows the legacy of the NIEO by holding that states should 
grant special treatment to developing countries in key areas of international law.108  
 
B. Explaining Chinese Exceptionalism 
 
1. Domestic Policy Preferences: Economic Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
 
China’s staggering growth rates have transformed China from a rural undeveloped 
country to an economic powerhouse.109 With GDP exceeding $4 trillion, China has the 
third largest economy in the world after the United States and Japan.110 China’s massive 
trade surplus has allowed it to accumulate over $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.111 
Few would question that China has emerged as an economic giant that wields significant 
power in the global economy. 
 
Despite its astounding economic growth, China remains a poor country. With the 
GDP per capita of about $6,000,112 China ranks 101st in the world. Lifting people out of 
poverty is of the utmost concern to the vast majority of the Chinese people. Acquiescence 
in authoritarian rule rests in part on the Chinese government’s ability to pursue economic 
growth, alleviate poverty and spread wealth to an increasing share of its population. 
China’s rapid economic rise has had the downside of increasing economic inequality 
within China, heightening the risk of political tensions. There is ethnic and religious 
conflict in the west, and civil unrest throughout the country. The Chinese government has 
determined that only continued high economic growth can maintain social order and 
political stability.113 
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In its quest for continuing economic growth, China pursues an export-led growth 
strategy, and manipulates its currency so as to keep the prices of its exports artificially 
low. To further facilitate its trade, China acceded to the WTO as a developing country, 
taking advantage of the special and differential treatment available for developing 
countries.114  Special and differential treatment allows developing countries to benefit 
from longer time periods for implementing WTO commitments. These provisions also 
allow developed countries to increase trading opportunities for developing countries 
without offering comparable opportunities for other WTO member states.  
 
China has also insisted on special and differential treatment in global climate 
change negotiations. In 2006, China passed the United States as the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases in the world, and China’s emissions continue to grow at a very high 
rate. 115  China’s high rate of emissions is the result of its booming economy and 
consequent high use of energy in manufacturing. China’s comparative advantage in 
international manufacturing is partly based on low energy costs due to its large coal 
reserves. Thus, China has weak incentives to switch to alternative fuel sources and sign 
any international treaty that would force it to do so. 
 
To resist demands for significant cuts in its emissions, China has advocated a 
developmentalist response to climate change. It has proposed to use countries’ historical 
emissions as a benchmark for assigning emission reduction targets among states. Over 
the course of the history of industrialization, most emissions originated from developed 
countries when they were pursuing greater levels of development; akin to what China is 
currently doing. Alternatively, China has suggested that per capita emissions should form 
a baseline for contemplated emission reductions. Using per capita emissions as a 
benchmark for the state’s global responsibility would have a very different impact on 
populous China’s responsibilities than any metric focusing on total emissions: China’s 
current per capita emissions are only one-sixth of that of the US.116  
 
China’s position on international human rights can also be seen through the lens 
of developmentalism.  Against the western idea that political and civil rights take 
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precedence, China argues that these rights must be subordinated when they conflict with 
measures that promote economic growth and maintain political stability that is necessary 
for growth. 
 
2. Institutional Structure: Authoritarianism 
 
Insisting on respect for the diversity of political, cultural, and social systems,117 
China has resisted the ideals of democratic governance that threaten the core values of the 
one Party-state and the Chinese government’s ability to secure domestic political and 
social stability.118 Thus, Chinese notion of human rights is tilted in favor of economic and 
social rights at the expense of civil and political rights. As Gerald Chan has observed: 
 
Under China’s political structure and culture, human rights are granted by 
the state and can easily be taken away by the state. If individual human 
rights run against state interests, the latter will usually prevail.119 
 
International norms that protect political rights pose the greatest threat to the stability of 
the Chinese government. China may fear that consenting to any such norms would 
establish a focal point for dissident activity and lead to a more visible demand for 
political freedoms—a development that would resemble the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords, a 1975 agreement between the Western countries and the Soviet-bloc countries, 
which was widely seen to have fueled political dissident activity in the Soviet satellites 
and ultimately contributed to the collapse of communism.120  
 
The United States and other western democracies have long predicted that 
China’s receptiveness to economic globalization and liberal market institutions would 
spur political change in China. Yet the link between economic liberalization and 
democratization in China has proved to be elusive. China has enjoyed economic benefits 
from liberal international institutions while resisting any political liberalization that was 
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rights and fundamental freedoms” and which thus was argued to guarantee freedoms of thought, speech, 
conscience, religion and faith of all citizens of the signatory states, including the communist states. See 
Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975), 
available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf. 
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expected to follow from its increasing international engagement. The Chinese 
government has also nurtured a sentiment among its citizenry that the Western-style 
democracy would be unsuitable for China’s current economic conditions. According to 
the government, embracing civil and political rights incorporated in international human 
rights treaties would destabilize Chinese society and endanger its pursuit of economic 
welfare for the benefit of its citizens. This has resonated with many Chinese, who want to 
avoid China undergoing the social instability, weak economic growth, and declining 
national influence that Russia experienced after the Soviet Union collapsed. Chinese 
citizens’ support for the current regime is also fueled by some degree of nationalism and 
anti-Americanism, making them more receptive to authoritarianism and skeptical of the 
“imposition” of American-style democracy through international norms. 121 
Authoritarianism has also persisted as Western powers have pursued economic 
engagement with China rather than trying to influence China’s human rights policies.  
 
Despite its skepticism of many UN initiatives relating to individual rights, China 
views the UN as helpful in promoting China’s vision of international law. The UN does 
not pose a threat to China’s authoritarian government because of the exceptional status 
and influence China holds within the organization. As a permanent member of the 
Security Council, armed with a veto right, China knows that it can single-handedly 
prevent any UN action that adversely affects China’s interests.  The UN is not a 
democratic organ, and that suits China. Rather, the UN is a forum where China enjoys an 
equal voice with the other great powers. The Security Council seat also provides China’s 
its most effective means to balance and constrain US power.122 China is therefore eager 
to maintain the current structure of the UN system and offers its unwavering support for 
the authority of the UN Security Council.123 
 
IV. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM REVISITED: PRO-MARKET DEMOCRACY 
 
A. American Exceptionalism Defined 
 
1. Negative Liberties and Markets 
 
 The United States has a longstanding commitment to political and civil rights. 
These commitments are reflected in the United States’ attitude toward human rights 
treaties. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the human rights treaty that embodies the standard list of civil and political rights. 
                                                            
121 Ying Ma, China’s Stubborn Anti-Democracy, 141 POLICY REV. 3, 11 (Feb./Mar. 2007). 
122 See supra note 79. 
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Towards an Enhanced Role of the UN 
Security Council in Maintaining Peace and Security (Nov. 21, 2003),  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/zyjh/t45317.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2009). 
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It has refused to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, the human rights treaty that embodies the standard list of social, economic, and 
cultural rights. The United States’ approach to other human rights treaties fits this pattern. 
Rights to be free from torture and genocide are derived from civil and political rights that 
prohibit the government from abusing its citizens; accordingly, the United States has 
ratified the Torture and Genocide conventions. Other treaties, for example, those 
promoting the rights of children and disabled persons, concern social rights which the 
United States defines more narrowly; they have not been ratified. 
 
 These commitments are also reflected in American foreign policy.124 The U.S. 
State Department compiles an annual report that criticizes foreign countries for violating 
human rights. Each country report follows a template that focuses on civil and political 
rights—including free speech and association, religious freedom, torture, voting—and 
ignores social and economic rights such as education, health care, and social insurance.125 
The only exceptions to this pattern are that the reports do have a section on the right to 
unionize, which falls somewhere between an economic right (to representation in the 
workplace) and civil right (to associate), and occasionally mention child welfare issues. 
The reports do not comment on these omissions, which would appear quite substantial to 
the rest of the world, which has mostly ratified the ICESCR and related treaties. The 
unstated assumption is that the American conception of human rights is the same as the 
international human rights which the reports address. 
 
 The United States has not consistently put economic and military pressure on 
countries that violate civil and political rights. Like other countries, it makes exceptions 
for friends and other important countries that it must do business with. For example, in 
1993 President Clinton granted trade concessions to China subject to China improving its 
human rights protections. A year later, however, President Clinton backed down from 
linking China’s trading status to human rights in order to pursue a “new path” in the US’s 
relations with China.126  Delinking human rights from trade was motivated by the US’s 
                                                            
124 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
45–46 (2006) (“Abroad, we will work with our allies on three priorities: [1.] Promoting meaningful reform 
of the U.N., including: Reinvigorating the U.N.’s commitment, reflected in the U.N. Charter, to the 
promotion of democracy and human rights . . . [2.] Enhancing the role of democracies and democracy 
promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions, including: [s]trengthening and 
institutionalizing the Community of Democracies, [f]ostering the creation of regional democracy-based 
institutions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, [and i]mproving the capacity of the U.N. and 
other multilateral institutions to advance the freedom agenda through tools like the U.N. Democracy Fund . 
. .”). 
125 See, e.g., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2008,  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/index.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).  
126 White House Office of Communications, President in Press Conference on China MFN Status, 1994 
WL 209851 (May 27, 1994). 
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desire to secure China’s cooperation in persuading North Korea not to develop nuclear 
weapons. The US also wanted to make sure it did not lose large trade deals, including 
Chinese government’s aircraft orders, by insisting on progress on civil and political rights 
in China.127  
 
U.S. international rhetoric relentlessly promotes democracy, and has at least since 
Woodrow Wilson. In his Fourteen Points speech that justified American entry into World 
War I, Wilson stressed the right to self-determination, which has since been understood 
to mean that nations should govern themselves by democratic means. 128  This right 
appeared in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which lay out the United States’ (and Britain’s) 
goals in World War II.129 Throughout the Cold War, the United States described itself as 
the leader of the “free world”—that part of the world in which democracy flourished. In a 
famous article written in 1979, the future Reagan UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
justified American support for dictatorships in the Cold War on the ground that merely 
authoritarian governments (as opposed to communist governments) might eventually 
democratize.130 
 
 The collapse of communism and the end of cold war did not change the American 
stance on democracy. Indeed, the U.S. government over three administrations has made a 
concerted effort to claim that democracy is a norm of international law. The Clinton 
administration declared its commitment to promote democracy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, among other places.131 The Bush administration’s “freedom agenda” sought 
to promote democracy in the Middle East.132 This policy supplied one of the rationales 
for the Iraq War. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama also declared his support for 
promotion of democracy abroad, and in the first few months of his administration, 
officials have expressed this policy on multiple occasions.133 
                                                            
127 See JACKSON et al., International Economic Relations (5th ed. 2008). 
128 See Our Documents—Transcript of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (1918), 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=62&page=transcript (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). 
129 Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom (“Atlantic Charter”), U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1600, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2788FECD-8FACF71E/natolive/official_texts_16912.htm. 
130 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, 68(5) COMMENTARY 34, 37 (Nov. 1979). 
131  See Joint Statement Released in Conjunction with the U.S.-EU Summit: Human Rights and 
Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dec. 5, 1997), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/eu/971205_useu_bosnia_hr.html (“The United States and the 
European Union have thus decided to coordinate their efforts to enhance their means to work with the 
parties in a constant dialogue with the aim of promoting democratic normalization and the stabilization of 
the region.”). 
132Sarah E. Yerkes & Tamara Cofman Wittes, What Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration’s 
Freedom Agenda, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2006/09middleeast_wittes.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 
2010).  
133 See, e.g., James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, Remarks at the 5th Community of Democracies 
Ministerial (July 12, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/s/d/2009/126052.htm (asserting before the 
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 The United States has also promoted free trade and free markets for more than 
half a century. The U.S. government initiated the GATT/WTO system in 1948,134 and its 
commitment to maintaining and expanding this system has never wavered. During the 
cold war, the United States distinguished itself from the Soviet Union in part on the basis 
of its commitment to markets and the security of property rights. During this period, the 
United States was also the leading critic of redistributive claims made by developing 
countries. With the collapse of communism, the “Washington Consensus” emerged, a 
bundle of policy prescriptions that emphasized macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline, 
privatization of government-owned resources, and liberalization of the economy.135 The 
United States, predominantly through the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, pressured developing countries to adopt these policies, often making loans 
conditional on significant reform in these directions. American institution-building after 
the cold war—including the expansion of NATO, the inauguration of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the development of 
the GATT system with the creation of the WTO—were all designed to entrench 
American political and economic values as global values.136 
 
2. Military Force to Maintain Global Order 
 
 The United States believes in the use of military force in order to maintain global 
order and, less explicitly, to advance democracy and human rights. During the cold war, 
the United States pursued a policy of containment of the Soviet Union—an effort to 
prevent the Soviet Union from extending its influence into other countries. The policy 
took two forms: bolstering allies and undermining enemies, often with covert operations, 
including the rendering of assistance to indigenous insurgencies. During the Cuban 
missile crisis, the United States explicitly used military force in violation of the UN 
Charter, when it blockaded Cuba (a traditional act of war); other interventions in Latin 
American also were unilateral. After the cold war, the United States turned its focus on 
“rogue states” that engaged in illegal conduct, and used force against, or threatened to use 
force against, Panama, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. 
 
 In general, the United States has tried to give legal justifications for it use of 
force. It has frequently cited authority under the UN Charter. The Korean War had 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Community of Democracies delegates that “[o]ur common efforts reinforce the universality of the 
democratic values and serve as a powerful response to those who would argue that democracy belongs only 
to one region, or history or tradition” and listing the many regional “democratic backtracking” mechanisms 
in the AU, OAS, EU, OSCE, and ASEAN). 
134 World Trade Organization,Understanding the WTO—The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
135 Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 973, 
973-74 (2006). 
136 See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY 215-56 (2001). 
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Security Council authorization. American participation in the Vietnam War occurred at 
the invitation of the South Vietnamese government; hence, it was an example of 
collective self-defense, which is authorized by the UN charter. The Gulf War had 
Security Council authorization. So did the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Iraq War 
of 2003 was not explicitly authorized by the Security Council, but the United States went 
to great lengths to justify the use of force on the basis of Security Council resolutions that 
suspended hostilities against Iraq at the end of the 1991 war, conditional on Iraqi 
cooperation in an inspection regime, which did not take place. 
 
 However, the United States has not always derived its authority from the UN 
Charter. As noted above, in 1999 the United States, along with the other NATO 
countries, launched an air attack on Serbia, which resulted in Serbia withdrawing from its 
renegade province of Kosovo, which it had been trying to bring under control. Serbia had 
long been a troublemaker in the Balkan, and had sowed disorder through its aggressive 
military posture during the collapse of Yugoslavia from 1991 to the Dayton Peace 
Accord of 1995.137 The collapse of stability in the region had immediate harmful impacts 
on European countries, which had to deal with refugees. In addition, there was a great 
deal of pressure to stop the atrocities that were taking place on all sides. The 1999 
invasion had a number of motives—to support European allies, to prevent Serbians from 
ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Albanian stock, and to punish an international 
troublemaker. The invasion lacked Security Council authorization.138 
 
 The United States did not always take a consistent line on its legal rationales for 
the use of military force. But the most common themes were: Security Council 
authorization; self-defense (including collective self-defense); and protection of 
democratically elected governments (and sometimes authoritarian governments) from 
foreign aggression. The Bush administration claimed at various points the right to launch 
preemptive or preventive wars in self-defense. But the Bush administration and previous 
American administrations never claimed that the United States has the exclusive right to 
go to war for these purposes; the arguments were always made in universalistic terms. 
 
                                                            
137 See Warren Zimmermann, The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 74(2) 
FOREIGN AFF., 2, 2, 12-14 (Mar./Apr. 1995) (relating a personal account of the dissolution of Yugoslavia).  
138  President Clinton contended that Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 implicitly granted 
authority for military intervention by affirming “that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes 
a threat to the peace and security of the region.” GARY SHARP, SR., JUS PACIARII: EMERGENT LEGAL 
PARADIGMS FOR U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS 313-14 (1999). The United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium 
argued that authorization was unnecessary since intervention supported “the values represented in Article 
2(4).” James P. Terry, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Legal Reality and Political 
Pragmatism, 2004(8) ARMY LAWYER 36, 45 (Aug. 2004).   
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 Similarly, the American attitude toward international criminal law has been 
expressed in universalistic rhetoric. The United States refused to ratify the Rome Statute 
creating the International Criminal Court and has expressed unhappiness with a range of 
domestic statutes in foreign countries that permit prosecution of international crimes on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction. In both cases, the United States feared politically 
motivated prosecutions of American soldiers and politicians. It does not trust an 
international body and foreign governments to treat Americans fairly. But the United 
States never sought an exemption for Americans alone.139 Its original conception of the 
ICC was that its authority would be conditional on Security Council authorization. Once 
such authorization was secured, the ICC would be able to prosecute anyone in any 
country. 
 
B. Explaining American Exceptionalism 
 
1. Domestic Policy Preferences: Markets, Liberty, Democracy 
 
 The United States is one of the world’s oldest continuous democracies and 
democratic principles are deeply embedded in the political culture. The negative liberties 
in the Bill of Rights have also been internalized by Americans and American institutions. 
The United States’ commitment to free markets has helped give it the most powerful 
economy in the world. Although this commitment to the market is often exaggerated—
local regulation is as old as the country, and national regulation of the market has made 
significant inroads on laissez faire since the start of the twentieth century—there is no 
doubt that Americans are more committed to markets than people in the other advanced 
democracies.140 The American economy is also among the least regulated.141 
 
 Americans are also more optimistic about, and tolerant of, war than people living 
in other advanced democracies, particularly in Europe. This can in part be attributed to 
different historical experiences. The United States emerged as a victor of World War I, 
having suffered battle deaths of 116,516 soldiers. 142  In comparison, France lost 
                                                            
139 The United States only began seeking bilateral immunity agreements after other countries ratified the 
Rome Statute. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Status of US Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements (BIAs), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf (last visited Feb. 
2, 2010). 
140 World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (follow “Online Data Analysis” hyperlink; 
then click “Begin Analysis” button; then follow “WVS 2005-2008” hyperlink; then check “Select All”; 
then click “Confirm Selection”; then click “Private vs. state ownership of business” hyperlink) (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2010). 
141 See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, et al., The Regulation of Entry, 67 Q. J. ECON. 1, 22 (2002). 
142  Meredith Reid Sarkees, COW Inter-State War Data, 1816-1997 (v3.0), 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/cow2 data/WarData/InterState/Inter-State War Participants (V 3-0).csv. See 
generally Meredith Reid Sarkees & Phil Schafer, The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997, 
18 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI.123 (2000). 
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1,385,000, Germany lost 1,773,700, Britain lost 908,371, and Russia lost 1,700,000.143 
France, Germany, and Britain had much smaller populations, of course. The United 
States’ triumph in World War II was even more complete. The United States had 
significant casualties—405,400 missing or killed—but far less than Germany (3.5 million 
missing or killed), Japan (1.7 million missing or killed), and Russia (7.5 million missing 
or killed).144 Cities throughout Europe were destroyed by the fighting; the United States 
mainland was virtually untouched.145 Europeans suffered from refugee crises, hunger, 
and austerity in the aftermath of the war; American civilians enjoyed an economic boom. 
Since then, the United States has fought a number of “small” wars—many of them 
frustrating and inconclusive, with one defeat in Vietnam. But in none of these wars did 
the United States lose more soldiers than France did in the World War I battle of Verdun 
alone, which resulted in the deaths of 60,000 French soldiers. 
 
 Europeans and Americans derived different lessons from these experiences. In 
Europeans one finds a deep strain of pacifism which is almost unknown in the United 
States. While European governments joined NATO and fought in a few small wars, anti-
militarism continues to dominate, particularly on the Continent. Note, however, that anti-
militarism has not spread beyond Europe except for Japan. China, Russia, India, Israel, 
and many other countries have maintained strong armies and fought major wars since 
World War II—and China and Russia have suffered in twentieth-century wars to a degree 
comparable to that of European countries. 
 
2. Institutions: Populist Democracy and Powerful Military 
 
 From the institutional standpoint, three features about the United States stand out: 
it is a democracy; it supports a market economy; and it has an enormous military. We 
have already discussed the first two features: they reflect public opinion rooted in 
tradition. More than that, they are institutions that are widely regarded as successful. It 
seems natural for Americans to urge other countries to adopt similar institutions. 
 
                                                            
143 Sarkees, supra note 142. 
144 Id.. Fighting in both the European and Pacific theatres, United States still suffered fewer battle deaths 
than Britain (418,765 missing or killed). Id. France’s military only lost 2,500 missing or killed; however, 
since it was occupied after 1940 subsequent losses were only suffered by the forces in exile at the time of 
occupation. Id.  
145 The United States suffered essentially no civilian deaths; Britain, separated from continental Europe by 
the English Channel, had 60,600 killed as a result of aerial bombing; Germany and Russia exited the war 
with 2.35 million and 6.7 million civilians dead, respectively. JOHN ELLIS, WORLD WAR II: A STATISTICAL 
SURVEY: THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND FIGURES FOR ALL THE COMBATANTS 253-54 (1993).   
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 But institutions matter in other ways. The democratic peace literature suggests 
that democracies do not go to war with other democracies;146 they do go to war with non-
democracies. If this pattern reflects causal factors, then it is not surprising that 
democracies would want other countries to be democracies if possible. The absence of 
war may be just one manifestation of a deeper affinity among democracies, which allows 
them to cooperate in many ways. Similarly, countries with developed market institutions 
may prefer to deal with similar countries; trade is no doubt easier when institutions 
resemble each other and reflect market imperatives. European integration, which began 
as a customs union but progressed toward unification of economic policy and law, has 
reflected these pressures. The U.S. government may seek to encourage other countries to 
adopt American-style institutions because cooperation with such countries becomes 
easier and more beneficial. 
 
 The EU shares the United States’ commitment to democracy. But this shared 
commitment masks different political cultures. In European countries, the public tends to 
defer to self-perpetuating political and bureaucratic elites. Elections are referenda on the 
performance of the governing party; the political leaders themselves work their way up 
the party hierarchy. American democracy has a strong populist skepticism of elites. The 
political class is easily penetrated by unknowns who ride a wave of populist enthusiasm 
(Jimmy Carter, Barack Obama, Sarah Palin, Ross Perot)—an almost unheard-of 
phenomenon in Europe, where populists are kept at the fringes. The EU itself is governed 
by a bureaucratic elite appointed by the political elites of its member states. Efforts to 
overcome this widely recognized “democratic deficit” by transferring power to the 
European Parliament have so far been unsuccessful.147 
 
 This divide may explain why European countries support international institutions 
more readily than the United States does. These institutions, like the EU itself, are staffed 
by the same kind of elite politician that governs European countries. Europeans, 
accustomed to deferring to their leaders, also defer to the international institutions those 
leaders create and staff. Americans, by contrast, distrust their leaders and, fearing a 
backlash from the voters, American politicians are reluctant to insist that those voters 
                                                            
146 See BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1994). The U.S. government seems to agree. 
see A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 2 (“In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and 
enhances both our security and prosperity. Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each 
other against common threats, encourage free trade, and promote sustainable economic development. They 
are less likely to wage war or abuse the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free 
markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States will support this trend by 
remaining actively engaged in the world.”)  
147 See Rabkin, supra note 51, at 274. 
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submit to another, even more remote layer of bureaucratic governance at the international 
level. 
 
 The third institutional feature—the enormous military—also sets the United 
States apart from other states. It is an understatement to say that the United States is the 
dominant military power in the world. In 2005, the United States spent $503 billion on 
military expenditures, almost half of the $1.16 trillion spent worldwide.148 As Table 1 
shows, in absolute terms United States spending dwarfs the amounts spent on the nine 
next most expensive militaries.149 This was not always the case. The United States was a 
military weakling in the nineteenth century up until World War I. But wealthy, populous 
countries can become military powers and the United States did so during World War II. 
Since then, its only rival has been the now-defunct Soviet Union. 
 
Table 1: Countries with the Highest Military Expenditures, 2005150 
Country Military Expenditures (Billions) 
United States $503.0 
China $85.3 
United Kingdom $55.9 
France $52.9 
Japan $43.9 
Germany $38.1 
Italy $33.5 
Russia $31.1 
Saudi Arabia $25.4 
India $18.8 
 
 The United States maintained an enormous military during the cold war because 
of the Soviet threat. Accordingly, people believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
would deliver a “peace dividend” in the form of smaller budgets. The era of small 
military budgets was brief, however, as it became clear that the United States could use 
military force to achieve its foreign policy aims. Indeed, the United States became 
                                                            
148 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005,  
http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2009). 
149  However, in relative terms the United States spends only 4.06 percent of its GDP on military 
expenditures ranking it 28th out of the 173 countries ranked by the CIA. CIA - The World Factbook – 
Country Comparison :: Military expenditures – percent of GDP,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html (last visited Aug. 3, 
2009).  
150 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005,  
http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2009). 
41 
 
embroiled in several more wars after the end of the cold war, culminating in the conflict 
with al Qaeda.  
  
 It is hardly surprising, then, that the United States should try to protect its freedom 
to use military force, just as it is not surprising that the United States should seek to 
duplicate its democratic and market institutions in foreign countries. It is playing to its 
institutional strengths. But in taking these positions, the United States uses universalistic 
rhetoric. It does not claim that the United States alone should be able to use its military: 
all countries have the same right to resort to military force under defined circumstances. 
Similarly, democracy and free markets are not just the prerogatives of the United States: 
all people should have access to democratic and market institutions. 
 
V. ARE EXCEPTIONALIST STATES ALSO EXEMPTIONALIST? 
 
We have argued that the great powers—including the US, the EU and China—
advance their exceptionalist views of international law in ways that reflect their 
distinctive values and serve their particular interests. None of the exceptionalist states, 
however, calls for a different set of rules that would apply to that state alone. Instead, 
they call for a universal application of the international rules embedding their respective 
exceptionalist vision. This is the key distinction between exceptionalism and 
exemptionalism. 
 
A. Rejecting American, European and Chinese Exemptionalism 
 
In Part I, we disputed the contention that the United States is exemptionalist. As 
we noted, there are no examples of the United States explicitly arguing that it is exempt 
from the rules that apply to other countries. Like other great powers, the United States 
advances a particular vision of international law that reflects its values, serves its 
interests, and takes advantage of its institutional capacities. But its vision is universal, in 
the sense that the rules and interpretations it advances are the same for all countries. The 
US has frequently insisted that its norms and practices should provide the basis for 
international law. This is different from the US exempting itself from the rules that apply 
to other states.  
 
It is also wrong to depict the EU as an exemptionalist power. Critics have pointed 
out that the EU is a champion of multilateral trade liberalization yet the European single 
market is the most extreme example of trade-diverting regionalism. Similarly, the EU 
promotes the most-favored nation principle in the WTO yet maintains preferential trading 
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arrangements with Europe’s colonies.151  But the EU is not seeking to carve out an 
exemption for itself. Instead, the EU takes the stand that regionalism is compatible with 
multilateralism; that regional trade blocks are building blocks and not stumbling blocks 
for multilateral trade liberalization. Similarly, preferential trade agreements are consistent 
with the principle of “special and differential treatment” of developing countries, the EU 
claims.  
 
 It is also wrong to suggest that the EU’s voting practices amount to 
exemptionalism.152 The EU is not enjoying the privilege of double-voting: depending on 
whether the issue falls under the Community competence or the national competence, the 
EU either casts the votes on behalf of the member states or the member states cast their 
votes individually.153 The EU cannot vote independently in addition to the votes cast by 
member states. 154  The practice of coordinating a negotiation position yet casting 
individual votes is consistent with the character of the EU: the EU is not a state but a tight 
economic community and a loose political union among 27 independent nation states. 
That independent nation states each retain a right to vote is not exemptional.  
 
 The best argument for European exemptionalism comes from the global climate 
change negotiations. The EU insisted it would be treated as a single state when 
calculating the emissions that the EU members were entitled to under the Kyoto Protocol. 
In practice this “Kyoto bubble” meant that some EU member states’ increases in 
emission could be offset by emission reductions in others.155 The EU first opposed a 
                                                            
151  See Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997). 
152 See Safrin, supra note 14, at 1328 (claiming that the EU seeks different rules for itself because of the 
“exceptional accommodations” its institutional structures require). 
153 In the WTO, however, individual member states vote even though the external trade policy falls under 
the Community’s competence. This is partly justified by the expansion of the WTO to new areas, including 
services and IPR where the EC and the member states share competence and where the EU could not 
legally exercise the vote of its individual member states. See Opinion 1/94 of the Court of 15 November 
1994, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the 
protection of intellectual property—Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, at Ruling, ¶¶ 1–3. 
Consistent with their individual voting rights, all member states pay dues to the WTO based on their total 
trade, including intra-EU trade. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 58 (2d ed. 2001). 
154 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1998, 37 I.L.M. 32, art. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. For a sole 
example to the contrary, see; Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks, Nov. 12, 2007, available at  
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/trtdocs_wo016.html. 
155 It is also questionable that the “Kyoto bubble” should be considered exemptionalist per se. When a 
regional trading block is formed, the WTO allows for an individual country belonging to a regional 
customs union or a free trade area to increase its duties and other barriers to trade as long as trade barriers 
on the whole will not be higher than the corresponding duties and trade barriers before the formation of the 
regional trading block. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
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similar arrangement within other developed countries. This, some would argue, would 
have amounted to EU exemptionalism. 156  However, other states rejected the EU’s 
proposal for a sui generis treatment, and the EU agreed to allow emissions trading 
between other states as well.157 Consequently, the possible (failed) exemptionalism in 
connection with the climate change negotiations aside, the argument for the EU’s 
exemptionalism remains thin.  
 
China has also been accused of exemptionalism. Critics point to China’s 
insistence on differential treatment to account for its developmental needs.158 However, 
China does not argue that China alone should benefit from this principle. China argues 
that, as a general rule, international obligations should be relaxed for developing 
countries. This universal rule should apply to all, including (but not singling out) China. 
It is not a coincidence that China is among the many beneficiaries of this universal rule. 
No state advances international rules that are inconsistent with its national interests. But a 
state pursuing a universal rule that is consistent with its interests is not the same as the 
state embracing exemptionalism, even if that universal rule would at times lead to a state 
being exempted from some international responsibilities. 
 
To illustrate the difference between exceptionalism and exemptionalism, consider 
income tax policy as an example from domestic law. Few would portray progressive 
income tax policy as a kind of exemptionalism for the poor. Most people believe that 
different individuals have “common but differentiated responsibilities” to pay taxes. 
Progressive taxation reflects a public policy based on the idea of fairness and 
redistribution. It can be contrasted with policies that exempt specified individuals from 
paying their taxes. China does not seek to create a system that exempts China alone from 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
U.N.T.S. 194, arts. XXIV:5(a), XXIV:5(b). The idea is the same: offsetting emissions or trade barriers is 
allowed as long as the EU as a whole ensures that a certain maximum level of tariffs or emissions is not 
exceeded. 
156 Safrin, supra note 14, at 1334-1335. 
157 See id. at 1332-33. Cf. Convention on Biological Diversity, Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on 
biosafety, Individual Government Submissions on the Contents of the Future Protocol, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/BSWG/Inf.2 (May 6, 1997), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/bs/bswg-
02/information/bswg-02-inf-02-en.pdf (indicating that the EU proposed separate treatment for regional 
economic integration organizations). 
158 Safrin, supra note 14, at 1342-50; C. Fred Bergsten, A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should 
Respond to China’s Economic Challenge, 87(4) FOREIGN AFF. 57 (July/Aug. 2008) (reporting that some 
have construed China’s policy as “the usual free-riding and skirting of responsibility by a powerful 
newcomer”); cf. Stanley J. Michalak, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Part 5: The U.S. Must 
Reassess Its Role, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #477, at 7 (1985), available at 
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/9236/87514_1.pdf?sequence=1 (accusing 
developing countries, generally, of keeping double standards); John N. Moore, Grenada and the 
International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 167 (1984) (arguing that the international 
community is more tolerant of violations of law when totalitarian regimes, generally, act purportedly for 
“revolutionary” or “anti-imperialist” goals). 
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its rules; it is seeking universal commitment to a “progressive” system of international 
law with development-adjusted rights and responsibilities.  
 
China is not the sole beneficiary of the developmentalist international order. The 
World Bank classifies only sixty-six countries as high income countries.159 The rest are 
commonly viewed as developing countries. China also acknowledges that some countries 
are appropriately perceived as “least developed countries” that are entitled to even greater 
flexibilities than China and other “wealthier developing countries.” Also, assuming that 
China can maintain its trajectory of economic development, China will one day lose its 
status as a developing country. Nothing in China’s international law rhetoric suggests that 
any country, China included, would have an inherent or lasting basis of claiming a right 
to special and differential treatment.  
 
B. Exemptionalism and Violation of International Law 
 
 One might argue that states’ rhetoric is besides the point; what matters is their 
behavior. The United States is exemptionalist because it violates international law that 
does not suit its interests. It hardly matters that the United States does not admit that it 
violates international law, or does not claim a de jure privilege to violate international 
law that binds others. Behind the rhetoric, the United States engages in de facto 
exemptionalism.  
 
 The problem with this argument is that all states violate international law some of 
the time. For the United States, the bill of particulars includes the 2003 Iraq war, the 1999 
Kosovo War, torture and extraordinary rendition in connection with the war on terror, 
and a number of trade violations. For the EU, there is a similar list—the 1999 Kosovo 
War, complicity in extraordinary rendition, trade violations, and—for a substantial group 
of member states—the 2003 Iraq War. For China, an authoritarian state, one can point to 
extensive human rights violations, including the suppression of political dissent and 
religious freedom. Normal states also sometimes violate international law. Human rights 
violations, including torture, and violations of countries’ WTO obligations are 
widespread.160 
 
 Our argument is not that the United States violates international law less than 
other countries do. We do not seek to, or even know how to, count up violations and 
compare them. Our argument is different. It is that there is nothing distinctive about the 
                                                            
159  The World Bank, Data and Statistics, http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0 (last visited Aug. 7, 
2009). 
160 See, e.g., Michael J. Gilligan & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Do Norms Reduce Torture?, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 
445 (2009). 
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United States, qualitatively speaking. Like the other major powers, and indeed like many 
normal states, it sometimes violates international law. Either all states are exemptionalist, 
in which case the term is useless, or none is. 
 
 A similar point can be made about behavior that falls short of international law 
violation but that is in tension with a state’s exceptionalist stance on international law. As 
we noted earlier, many people argue that the United States engages in double standards 
when it coddles friendly dictators while proclaiming a commitment to human rights. The 
EU engages in similar behavior, of course. Both the United States and the EU try to 
maintain friendly relations with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states because of 
their geopolitical and economic importance. These countries are simply balancing 
objectives that are not always consistent—prosperity and security, on the one hand, the 
promotion of human rights, on the other. 
 
 China does the same thing, but in the opposite direction. Having proclaimed the 
inviolability of sovereignty, it has joined some resolutions condemning human rights 
violations in other states.161 Doing so, China is compromising its stance on international 
law for reputational reasons—it wants to maintain good relations with the human-rights 
promoting states. As we noted above, China’s position on free trade and the right to 
development is not always carried through consistently.162 
 
 In sum, all states have multiple objectives that are in tension with each other. The 
compromises that results are just normal politics, not special behavior that deserves the 
label of exemptionalism. 
 
C. Embedded Exemptionalism in International Law 
 
The above discussion has shown that none of the exceptionalist states is explicitly 
exemptionalist. In forgoing exemptionalism, however, exceptionalist states do not forgo 
their own interests. Exceptionalist states consistently take advantage of international 
institutions that are constructed in ways that favor them. They have been central in 
creating—and remain essential in maintaining— international institutions that embody 
their influence and preferences. The formation of international institutions has enabled 
exceptional states to create hierarchies, reinforce privileges, and institutionalize their 
disproportionate influence over international law.  
                                                            
161 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (describing China’s decision to join in condemnation against 
Myanmar). 
162 For a book-length account of China’s compliance with international law, see generally Chan, supra note 
119. Chan says that China’s compliance with arms control treaties is “satisfactory,” with trade treaties is 
“good,” with human rights treaties is “fair to poor,” and with environmental protection treaties is “poor.” 
Id. at 205. 
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The United Nations offers the most compelling example of the presence of 
exemptionalism or “double standards” in international law. Americans, Europeans and 
Chinese, (together with Russians) all enjoy a permanent seat and a right to a veto in the 
UN Security Council. The UN Charter explicitly sets the exceptionalist states apart from 
all other states and vests them with exclusive rights and responsibilities. This is the most 
significant departure from the principle of sovereign equality of states. Most 
commentators concede that the composition of the Security Council fails to correspond to 
the distribution of power in today’s world.163 Some further question the fairness or the 
legitimacy of the organization as a result.164 Still, granting the permanent five members 
of the UN Security Council a privileged position among nations remains widely 
accepted—if only because of the political infeasibility of any alternative: the current five 
permanent members are unlikely to agree to empower other states by disempowering 
themselves.165  
 
A similar charge of “collective exemptionalism” or “double standards” may be 
lodged against the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”). The 
NPT divides states into nuclear and non-nuclear states and vests the two groups of states 
with different rights and obligations. Under the Treaty, states that do not possess nuclear 
weapons renounce any future acquisition of such weapons and undertake to pursue 
nuclear technology only for civilian purposes. In contrast, states that do possess nuclear 
weapons (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—hence the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council)166 undertake to pass nuclear technology 
to non-nuclear weapon states only for peaceful purposes.  Thus, like the UN Charter, the 
NPT openly sets the exceptionalist (nuclear) states apart from normal (non-nuclear) 
states. However, unlike the UN Charter, the NPT provides for a quid pro quo. The non-
nuclear states have no obligation to enter the NPT and are free to develop nuclear 
weapons technology without violating international law. 
 
                                                            
163 See, e.g., Jacob K. Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational 
Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 240 (2009) (listing various General Assembly 
discussions on whether to change the composition of the Security Council and explaining the G-4’s bid for 
seats in the Security Council). 
164 See, e.g., David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 552, 558–60 (1993) (explaining how perceptions of illegitimacy that arise when the organization 
fails to live up to its “promise and spirit” may lead to failed negotiations). 
165 Daniel W. Drezner, The New New World Order, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 34, 35 (2007) (suggesting the 
European nations’ unwilling to “reduce their overrepresentation in multilateral institutions”); cf. Yehuda Z. 
Blum, Proposals for UN Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 639–44 (2005) (analyzing the 
potential power struggles that would result if countries tried to add seats to the Security Council). 
166 India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, which are either commonly known or widely believed to own 
nuclear weapons, are not participants to the NPT. (North Korea signed the Treaty, violated it and 
subsequently withdrew from it.)  
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 Similarly to the UN, the IMF and World Bank were set up after World War II to 
reflect the distribution of power at that time, disproportionally favoring the US and the 
European states. Americans and Europeans designed a voting system that allowed them 
to dominate decision-making: though the United States only constitutes 5% of the 
population of the IMF member states, it enjoys 17% of the votes—enough to give it a 
single-handed veto right over all decisions—and Europeans control 40% of the vote, 
despite only comprising 13% of the IMF member state population. This is particularly 
striking when contrasted with the 5% voting share that China and India hold collectively. 
The voting power in the World Bank mirrors that of the IMF. In addition, since the 
founding of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, the Europeans have chosen the head 
of the former and nominated the head of the latter. This de facto control of both 
institutions gives the US and the EU special status that allows them to grant loans and 
debt relief based on geopolitical and ideological considerations.167  
 
The WTO embodies a less hierarchical decision-making structure: It operates on 
the principle of consensus and gives all member states an equal vote. In practice, 
however, states with the largest economies drive the negotiation process. Similarly, the 
enforcement of the WTO commitments remains largely the privilege of powerful states. 
Powerful states may violate their trade commitments towards weaker trading partners, 
knowing that weaker states are unlikely to carry out retaliation against them even if they 
secure the WTO’s authorization to do so.168 Powerful states are therefore rarely targets of 
trade sanctions,169 yet uniquely positioned to employ trade sanctions against their trade 
partners.170 Though the WTO rules seem egalitarian on the surface, a closer look at the 
operation of these rules reveals a familiar hierarchical structure, present in most 
international institutions. 
 
                                                            
167  See International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power (July 10, 2009), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2009); World Bank, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member 
Countries (June 30, 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-
1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2009); Jeffrey D. Sachs, How to Run 
the International Monetary Fund, 143 FOREIGN POL. 60, 61 (2004) (insinuating that the current IMF 
managing director owes his job to the collusion of rich countries). 
168 See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 816–17 (2001).  
169 However, the powerful exceptionalist states may still engage in trade disputes among themselves, since 
the threat of retaliation is credible for those countries. 
170 For example, Ecuador needs access to the US market much more than the United States needs access to 
the Ecuadorian market. Ecuador would therefore be vulnerable to US sanctions whereas the United States 
would be only mildly harmed by retaliatory tariffs on the Ecuadorian border. Ecuador is also more likely to 
be dependent on US imports, and the decision to restrict the entry of US goods on its market is likely to 
hurt Ecuador much more than the US. Thus, the United States may intentionally violate its commitments 
towards Ecuador, knowing that Ecuador cannot follow through on its threats. 
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There is a significant irony here. While the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and 
many other international institutions have been criticized for their bias toward powerful 
countries, the United Nations has avoided this charge. Yet the United Nations is the only 
international institution that has the power to issue orders that legally bind all states while 
giving a privileged group of states the power to ensure that those orders never apply to 
them. Reform efforts have focused on expanding the group of states with veto power—
adding Germany, for example, or Japan, or Brazil, or India—but not in eliminating the 
basic distinction between great powers with veto rights or other privileges, and ordinary 
states without them. All states—exceptional as well as ordinary—appear to acquiesce in 
the basic premise of the Security Council: that significant interventions to keep the peace 
require the consent of the most powerful states but not the consent of other states. 
 
If this system has exemptionalist overtones, it has nothing to do with 
exceptionalism. No single exceptional state has authority in the UN system; instead, 
authority is shared by a group of powerful states, some of them exceptional, some not. 
The UN system does not reflect any single country’s distinctive vision; it reflects an 
overlapping consensus among the great powers and ordinary countries.171 
 
Now let us consider again the ICC. As we noted above, the EU sought to give the 
ICC independent authority to initiate prosecutions and trials. The United States sought to 
make the ICC’s authority depend on Security Council authorization, which would have 
given the United States (and other permanent members) a right of veto, which would 
have, in effect, immunized their citizens from prosecution. It is widely agreed that the EU 
position was “universalistic,” while the American position was exemptionalist. 
 
If this argument is correct, it reflects a deep irony. The U.S. position was just to 
add the ICC to the Security Council’s long list of existing powers. Thus, the argument 
boils down to a claim that increasing the power of the Security Council reflects an 
exemptionalist agenda—even though the Security Council has a high level of 
international legitimacy. 
 
But there is a more serious problem with the argument. The claim that the United 
States position is exemptionalist rests on a strong distinction between de jure and de 
facto. The United States can argue that its position is (de jure) universal because no 
special exception is made for Americans—Americans would not be granted immunity 
under the Rome Statute as the United States envisioned it. The skeptics would respond 
that the United States would be given de facto immunity because of its veto in the 
Security Council. But an exemptionalist charge can also be turned against the Europeans. 
                                                            
171 The same argument applies to the NPT. 
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The Rome Statute, as ratified, is universalistic in the sense that it applies to all nations. 
But, de facto, it does not apply to the Europeans because relatively few European soldiers 
are sent into combat and European law enforcement authorities investigate and prosecute 
international crimes and thus satisfy the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute. 
The Rome Statute would create greater risks for the United States than for Europeans 
because of the more frequent (and aggressive) use of military force by the former. So if 
the United States’ position on the Rome Statute was exemptionalist, so was the European 
position that was finally adopted—in the sense that both powers were determined to 
ensure that their own soldiers would never have to stand a trial before the ICC. 
 
Exemptionalism in this sense means a posture of advocating international treaties 
that place burdens on other states and no burdens, or fewer burdens, on one’s own state. 
There are many ways to do this. One could argue that obligations are contingent on the 
approval of an institution in which one has a veto right (the United States position). Or 
one could argue that obligations are such that one’s own state already satisfies them and 
other states do not (the European position). The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities is yet another version of this idea: here, developing states are given more 
limited obligations than developed states. To condemn exemptionalism in this sense is to 
condemn all states, because all states enter treaty negotiations with an eye to maximizing 
their benefits and minimizing their burdens. It is hard to make sense of exemptionalism 
except in the formal sense of demanding exemptions from general obligations of 
international law. Otherwise, charges of exemptionalism are just a complaint that a state 
fails to comply with international morality.  
 
The essence of the debate over exemptionalism should now be clear. It is an 
attempt to transform the debate about international morality, which is endlessly 
contested, into a debate about formal legal compliance with the law, which can at least in 
principle be resolved with legal methods. But the transformation fails. If exemptionalism 
is understood in a substantive sense—all treaties should be “fair”—it does not differ from 
international morality. If exemptionalism is understood in a formal sense—all states (or 
all similarly situated states) should be subject to the same obligations—it does constrain 
states. But by advocating universal legal obligations that burden other states and do not 
burden themselves, states can avoid charges of exemptionalism in the formal sense 
without sacrificing their interests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There has been a long debate about American exceptionalism which, until 
recently, has focused on American ideology, culture, and institutions. This debate has 
focused on those aspects of American life that set it apart from the rest of the world; 
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explanations have been sought in unique features of American history. The debate about 
the relationship between American exceptionalism and foreign policy is more recent. In 
this debate, scholars have again identified what seems to be unique about the United 
States, but here focusing on American foreign policy. They have then tried to explain 
how these distinctive features of American foreign policy have their source in America’s 
unique history. The foreign policy debate, unlike the original debate, has a strongly 
negative cast. American exceptionalism in foreign policy means that the United States 
does not comply with the universal rules of international law—it prefers to maximize its 
power or pursue idiosyncratic political ends. 
 
Our main argument is that, although there is much to criticize in American foreign 
policy, exceptionalism is not a useful target of criticism. Indeed, careful examination of 
the critics’ arguments reveals that they are not concerned with American exceptionalism 
or even exceptionalism per se; instead, they disapprove of American exceptionalism, 
wishing that the United States displayed European exceptionalism—that is, the approach 
to international law that European countries have taken. The above discussion has shown 
that most powerful states are “exceptionalist” in the sense that they seek to embody their 
values and interests in international law. The criticism of exceptionalism, then, is just a 
criticism of power, or the use of power to achieve ends of which the critic disapproves. 
 
Stronger complaints about exemptionalism (as opposed to exceptionalism) also 
turn out to be unpersuasive. All states violate international law some of the time; it makes 
little sense to call violators exemptionalists. If exemptionalism is understood to be the 
posture that a state does not have to follow rules that apply to all other states, then no 
state is exemptionalist; the category is empty. If exemptionalism is understood to be a 
tendency to support treaties that place greater burdens on other countries and fewer (or 
no) burdens on one’s own countries, then all states are exemptionalist. This is just a 
normal part of international bargaining. 
 
The United States, the EU, and China have particular visions of international law. 
Neither of these visions is simply “correct” as a matter of international law: all of the 
visions shape the content of international law. Scholars can do no better than evaluate 
these competing visions on the basis of their normative appeal and institutional 
sustainability, and argue for the vision (or some alternative) that they believe is best.  
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